A Critical Conversation on Climate Change ... - Green Choices

lessons unlearned 215398 Ibid. See also Shipra Bansal and Scott Kuhn, ‘Stoppingan Unfair Trade: Environmental Justice, PollutionTrading, and Cumulative Impacts in Los Angeles’,Environmental Law News, Spring 1998, pp. 16–18.399 Drury et al., op. cit. supra note 123.400 Ibid. It is disputed whether RECLAIM madepollution ‘hot spots’ worse or not. Installationsbuying RECLAIM credits were situated incommunities that had significantly higherpopulations of minorities and impoverished peoplewithin a half-mile radius than the Los Angeles-wideaverage. So, however, did installations selling credits.See Jacob Hawkins et al., ‘An Evaluation of theLA Regional Clean Air Incentives Market’, SantaBarbara School of Environmental Sciences andManagement, 2001.401 Driesen, op. cit. supra note 107.402 Drury et al., supra note 123; Moore, op. cit. supranote 61.403 David D. Doniger, ‘Point ... And Counterpoint’,Environmental Forum 4, 29, 1986, p. 34.404 Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 3.405 Marte Nordseth, ‘CDM EB takes measures against“perverse incentives”’, CDM Monitor, 27 October2004. Because some CDM host countries haverefrained from implementing climate-friendlypolicies so that CDM projects can still generatecarbon credits, the CDM Executive Board decidedin 2004 to require that policies introduced afterthe 1997 Kyoto Protocol that have led to increasedgreenhouse gas emissions not be included in projectbaselines. Yet if incentives for more emissions existin practice, they ‘should be taken into account inthe baseline’. The Board also decided that policiesaimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissionsimplemented after the adoption of the MarrakeshAccords in 2001 should be disregarded in thebaseline. In other words, project developers canclaim credits on a baseline that pretends that suchclimate-progressive policies do not exist.406 See Chapter 4, ‘South Africa – Carbon Credits fromthe Cities’.407 Axel and Katharina Michaelowa, ‘SustainableDevelopment: The Forgotten Aspect of the CDM?’,Joint Implementation Quarterly 11, 4, December2005, p. 8.408 See Environmental Rights Action, ‘No CarbonCredits for the West African Gas Pipeline’, BeninCity, Nigeria, 2004, http://www.eraction.org/modules.php?name=ERA_News&file=article&sid=33.409 ‘Court Orders Nigerian Gas Flaring to Stop’, E-LawAdvocate, Winter 2006, http://www.elaw.org/news/advocate/default.asp?issue=2006-1.410 See Chapter 4, ‘South Africa: Carbon Credits fromthe Cities’.411 Ben Pearson, then of CDM Watch, was the firstanalyst to document and explain this crucial pointin a series of thorough and clear papers. See www.cdmwatch.org.412 Moore, op. cit. supra note 61.413 Jane Ellis et al., ‘Taking Stock of Progress under theCDM’, OECD, Paris, 2004, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/58/32141417.pdf.414 The comparatively small credit volume yielded bysuch projects is due partly to the fact that they aredesigned to ‘reduce’ carbon dioxide rather than, say,methane, which is 21 times more potent as a climateforcinggas, or some HCFCs, which are 11,000 timesmore potent.415 World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market2004, Washington, DC, http;//www.carbonfinance.org.416 Ben Pearson, ‘Market Failure: Why the CleanDevelopment Mechanism Won’t Promote CleanDevelopment’, CDM Watch, Sydney, 2004, p. 2.417 For submissions on Suzlon, see http://www.cdmwatch.org.418 Ecofys, ‘Opportunities for Renewables under theKyoto Mechanisms’, Ecofys, The Netherlands, 2002,http://www.ecofys.com.419 Ben Pearson, The World Bank and the CarbonMarket: Rhetoric and Reality, Clean DevelopmentMechanism Watch, Sydney, 2005, p. 3.420 Ibid.421 Ibid., p. 6.422 See Chapter 4, ‘South Africa – Carbon credits fromthe cities’.423 This was the operational period of the PCF duringwhich the funds were placed. This table is thanks toBen Pearson.424 Figures taken from ‘Transnational CorporateBeneficiaries of World Bank Group Fossil FuelProjects, 1992 – August 2002’, Sustainable Energyand Environment Network, Washington, 2002,http://www.seen.org.425 Some of Mitsui’s contributions went toward theBiocarbon Fund, another World Bank-managedenterprise.426 Ben Pearson, ‘Market Failure: Why the CleanDevelopment Mechanism Won’t Promote CleanDevelopment’, CDM Watch, Sydney, 2004, http://www.cdmwatch.org.427 World Bank, Striking a Better Balance: ExtractiveIndustries Review, Washington, 2004.