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A Critical Conversation on Climate Change ... - Green Choices

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less<strong>on</strong>s unlearned 81‘The creati<strong>on</strong> of formallegal title and propertyregistrati<strong>on</strong> becomes amachinery for transferringproperty from small ownersand c<strong>on</strong>centrating it intolarger and larger hands.’ 39Timothy Mitchell, 2002take place in an ordered fashi<strong>on</strong> and with a high degree of certainty’is the ‘key role of the policy system’ in an emissi<strong>on</strong>s trading scheme. 33Nobody who holds emissi<strong>on</strong>s allowances, or is thinking of buying orselling them – whether polluter, broker, banker or investor – is goingto want anybody to be able to take them away arbitrarily.So just as corporati<strong>on</strong>s lobby for exempti<strong>on</strong> from polluti<strong>on</strong> regulati<strong>on</strong>s,they lobby to make sure emissi<strong>on</strong>s allowances amount to secureproperty rights and to get as many as they can. As ‘semi-permanentproperty rights,’ in the words of David Victor of the US Council <strong>on</strong>Foreign Relati<strong>on</strong>s, emissi<strong>on</strong>s permits are ‘assets that, like other propertyrights, owners will fight to protect’. 34Luckily for corporati<strong>on</strong>s, their privileged access to legislators enablesthem to secure carb<strong>on</strong> dump commodity for themselves merely bylobbying and pressure politics. Just as systems of private property inland give new m<strong>on</strong>eymaking powers to surveyors, officials and firmswith access to titling and licensing mechanisms, the property systemsof polluti<strong>on</strong> trading schemes give new commercial powers to thosewith access to legislators.As ec<strong>on</strong>omists Peter Cramt<strong>on</strong> and Suzi Kerr point out, the ‘enormousrents’ at stake ‘mean that interest groups will c<strong>on</strong>tinue to seek changesin the allocati<strong>on</strong> over time’:Firms may end up putting as much effort into rent capture as intofinding efficient ways to reduce carb<strong>on</strong> usage. Investments may bedelayed in the hope that high observed marginal costs would leadto more generous allowance allocati<strong>on</strong>s as compensati<strong>on</strong>. The increasedcomplexity of the programme… may lead some groups toseek exempti<strong>on</strong>s or b<strong>on</strong>us allowances… [I]nterest groups will fightbitterly for a share of annual rents. This fight will lead to direct costsduring the design of the policy. Groups will invest in lawyers, governmentlobbying, and public relati<strong>on</strong>s campaigns. Government officialswill spend enormous amounts of time preparing and analysingopti<strong>on</strong>s and in negotiati<strong>on</strong>s. This will lead to high administrativecosts and probably c<strong>on</strong>siderable delays in implementati<strong>on</strong>. 38Governments eager to placate industry are almost sure to give out toomany emissi<strong>on</strong>s rights. This in turn will make future cuts even moredifficult, while increasing pressures to reduce emissi<strong>on</strong>s in sectors thathave not been awarded rights (for example, domestic households, thetransport sector and the state).But hang <strong>on</strong> a minute. Regulators can be infl uenced into handing out resourcesto big companies even without envir<strong>on</strong>mental trading schemes. You can’t pinthat problem <strong>on</strong> emissi<strong>on</strong>s markets.

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