On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

the Balkans with a significant requirement for digital battle command. But because it was nothigh on the Army’s priority list, USAREUR bought commercial systems as surrogates for theABCS equipment it had not yet been issued. Additionally, as in home computers, hardware andsoftware upgrades continually outpaced the Army’s purchasing ability. For example, as the leaddigital division, only the 4th Infantry Division had the latest equipment and software. Becauseother units had various versions and surrogates, the Army had to move aggressively to bridgethe gaps.To further complicate matters, the Army needed to be interoperable with the otherservices and coalition partners. Joint battle command at the CENTCOM level would beconducted using the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). As a completely neworganization, the CFLCC had to create a C2 architecture where one had never existed. Aftersignificant discussion and analysis, CFLCC chose to combine joint systems with the ABCSand commercial systems the Army had been using, most notably Command and Control forPersonal Computers (C2PC).In anticipation of the looming challenge of achieving interoperability with the other servicesand coalition partners, the TRADOC commander, General John Abrams, brought togetherthree organizations in August 2002. These included the TRADOC Program Integration Officefor ABCS (TPIO-ABCS), directed by Colonel John Bartley; the Army’s Battle CommandBattle Lab (ABC-BL), directed by Colonel Jim Connelly; and a team of representatives fromvarious Army program managers responsible for the development, acquisition, and fieldingof the ABCS equipment. Bartley’s organization synchronized requirements for the 11 ABCScomponents and their integration into Army units. Connelly’s battle lab developed future battlecommand systems through experimentation and in coordination with commercial ventures.The program managers did the actual work of acquisition and fielding. Bartley, Connelly, andthe various program representatives met at Fort Leavenworth and set about finding a solutionfor the interoperability challenge. 56First, the group identified what hardware and software the other services, coalition partners,and Army units currently used. Then, they looked at courses of action to redistribute systemsor field new systems to ensure interoperability. Time was of the essence since there were onlya few months to field systems that normally take years to distribute. Whatever they selected,or rather recommended for selection, had to be issued, and then training teams had to train thereceiving units. Once they had some answers, Colonels Bartley and Connelly traveled to thePentagon and briefed the proposed solution to the Army’s deputy chief of staff for operations,Lieutenant General Dick Cody, who set the Army in motion to acquire and distribute theneeded hardware and software. 57The Army solution also provided for joint and coalition interoperability. The Army andMarine Corps already shared the same field artillery battle command system, but IRAQIFREEDOM required interoperability in other key tactical systems. Accordingly, the Armyprovided the deploying Marine Corps units with BFT and the Air and Missile Defense WarningSystem (AMDWS)—which provided an integrated picture of enemy aircraft and missiles aswell as friendly aircraft. The Army also provided systems to participating British forces. TheKuwaiti Patriot missile force was already interoperable with US Patriots, using the AMDWSlinkage already in place.61