On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

imagery, believed he had enough to find and attack the 2nd Armored Brigade, but only by “searchand attack techniques.” 91 The go-no go briefing included Wolf, Brigadier General Dan Hahn,the corps chief of staff, G3, G2, effects, and air support representatives. Despite fuel problems,delayed liftoff, and uncertainty about the precise location of the enemy, there was no dissent. 92The ExecutionDelayed 2 hours and 15 minutes as the troops sorted out who got fuel, helicopters beganlifting off at 0115 on 24 March. 93 From the start things did not go well. Colonel Wolf returnedto his command and control aircraft to find that he lacked the fuel to make the mission. Hewaited an additional 45 minutes to get more fuel. He was not the only one having problems.Some crews swapped aircraft to assure that key leaders boarded aircraft that had fuel. In theend, only 30 of the 31 Apaches left the assembly area, as one crashed on takeoff due to severebrownout conditions caused by the “moon dust.” 94Poor communications plagued the regiment throughout the mission with obvious effectson execution. When Colonel Wolf delayed the launch by 2 hours and 15 minutes, the regimentcould not alert supporting fixed-wing units. The ground SEAD fired at the adjusted time and inaccordance with the corps standard of 30 minutes before the helicopters’ time on target. Eventhis success proved a mixed blessing since many of the pilots considered 30 minutes too earlyand wondered if it acted more as a warning to the Iraqis than a suppression. Worse still, thefighters assigned to support the mission never received the adjusted mission time and departedas originally scheduled, which meant they were not on station during the actual attack. The corpsFire Effects Coordination Cell and air liaison officer did obtain some help. For example, B-52sdropped 26 JDAM bombs in support of the effort to rescue the pilots of the lone downed aircraft.Reportedly, some ground-attack aircraft engaged targets in a supporting kill box, but there areno specifics available. 95 Whatever problems the regiment experienced with the SEAD and CASexecution, the Iraqi air defense “system” was arguably not vulnerable to traditional SEADoperations—26 ATACMS and 26 JDAMS could not realistically suppress several hundred Iraqisdistributed throughout a densely populated urban area firing small arms and light air defenseartillery. 96 Fundamentally, the attack helicopters attacked alone and effectively unsupported.As they traveled up the route, although the lead troop of 6-6 CAV had no contact, 1-227AHB was already reporting enemy fire. En route to the target, when B/6-6 CAV oriented westat approximately 0100, all of the lights in the area, to include the cities of Al Haswah andAl Iskandariyah, blinked out for approximately 2 seconds. 97 Immediately thereafter, the skyerupted with all manner of ground fire, which was apparent by the red, yellow, and whitetracers. Initially unaimed, the fusillade of fire created a “wall” between the aircraft and theirobjectives. Although the Apaches were running with lights out, the lights from farms and townsilhouetted the attack helicopters against the night sky. Crews reported damage to their aircraftand difficulty maneuvering due to the volume of enemy fire. 98In the Apache, one of the two crewmen flies wearing helmet-mounted night vision gogglesto see things thermals do not, including, for example, wires and tracers. The second crewmanflies with thermals and the 30mm chain gun slaved to his head-up display. When the sky “lit”up with tracers, the aviator with goggles could see them, but the aviator who had immediatecontrol of the gun could not. Therefore, to add to their problems, one crewman had to talk theother on to the source of fire to suppress it.186