On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

More documents

Recommendations

Info

e enough resources to establish a complete and functioning network of communications,sensors, and systems everywhere in the world. As OIF demonstrates, the network must be built,shaped, and then maneuvered to ensure necessary connectivity and capability.Along with maneuvering the net, OIF suggests that for fast-paced offensive operations,ground forces need to break free of terrestrial-based, line of sight (LOS) communications.The pace of operations, global reach, and noncontiguous battlespace of 21st-century militaryoperations demand that all except the lowest-level tactical voice communications be spacebased. This will require significant joint investment in military satellite capabilities to ensurethe entire joint force has access with sufficient bandwidth to support networked systems.The OIF experience also suggests that networks do not have to provide a vast array offunctions to be effective. Clausewitz observed, “War is a very simple thing, yet in war thesimplest things are very difficult.” In OIF, networks eliminated some of the difficulty of doingsimple things. Commanders need to know where their forces are, where the enemy is, and howto coordinate the actions of their subordinates through passing messages, orders, and graphics.The most useful systems in OIF (C2PC, BFT, ADOCS, AFATDS, AMDWS, and MTS)provided the basic capabilities the force required.OIF’s TMD network and joint use of BFT and AMDWS reinforce the value of jointdigitization initiatives. Such initiatives, and those designed to standardize networks, are vitalto achieving a true NCW capability. The Army’s Future Force research and development isalready headed in the direction of full and complete joint connectivity.Meanwhile, the challenges of integrating US armed forces with allies and coalition partnerscontinue to grow. The provision of BFT and robust LNO teams to the 1st UK ArmouredDivision assisted in bridging the digital gap in OIF, but the growing post-Cold War disparityin technology between the US armed forces and allied forces is a fact. As the Army movestoward the Future Force and joint transformation proceeds, the gap is likely to grow wider.This is particularly likely in the area of networked battle command, where the US is investingheavily. Some likely coalition partners are unlikely to catch up, and others are investing inbattle command systems of their own that are not interoperable with US systems. Solutions thatfacilitate integrating coalition operations will have to be found.OIF also suggests that simply winning the fight for information will not be enough toensure victory. Early in OIF, the US employed operational fires (air, Tomahawks, ATACMS)to destroy much of Iraq’s strategic and operational communications infrastructure and toneutralize Iraq’s integrated air defense system. Yet, the defending Iraqi forces continued tofight fiercely. Primarily using simple instructions, they continued to maneuver and continuedto fight. The lesson is that although the Iraqis lost nearly every engagement, they did not giveup simply because they had lost the war for the networks.While not yet a truly netcentric force, the Army in OIF was clearly a net-enabled force, onethat was significantly more effective because of digitization efforts since DESERT STORM.Additionally, the Army’s efforts toward joint battle command enhanced the joint forces’capabilities for net-enabled operational maneuver, fires, and protection. These investments intechnology should be continued. They must include education in doctrine, organization, andleader development to assure that joint forces are truly able to wage netcentric warfare.418
Information OperationsOperation OIF is another step, but neither the first nor the last step, along the path of USarmed forces from Industrial-Age to information-age operations. While DESERT STORM isgenerally considered the first information-age campaign, virtually every aspect of Army andjoint information operations (IO) was more mature and robust in OIF. But much remains to bedone.Information Operations in the CampaignThroughout the era following DESERT STORM, CENTCOM continued to conduct IOagainst Saddam’s regime. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH had IO components inherent inmaintaining the no-fly zone. Similarly, operations in the north included IO. Identifying andrefining targets and building an audience for IO messages continued virtually without respiteover the decade preceding OIF. However, the tempo of operations accelerated in the fall of2002, characterized by increasingly bold efforts such as a large leaflet drop in December.IO planning supported tactical and operational objectives, including encouraging Iraqiunits to surrender, keeping civilians off the roads and out of harm’s way, and preventing thedestruction of the oil infrastructure. Kinetic and electronic warfare attacks focused on disruptingcommand and control discretely while minimizing collateral damage. Generally, CENTCOM,CFLCC, and the tactical forces fully integrated IO planning and execution during OIF.Assessing success in IO remained difficult, and it is still too early to draw many conclusionswith confidence. Frankly, with a few exceptions in electronic warfare and intelligence, it is hardto make the case that US efforts in the broad category of IO produced any dramatic results. USIO may have been more successful than suggested here since success in most of the domainsof IO is difficult to measure. “Battle damage assessment” is, to say the least, difficult in thisarena.Psychological Operations (PSYOP) achieved important success but experienced somedisappointments as well. PSYOP units can point with satisfaction to success in minimizingdamage to the oil fields and keeping civilians off roads. However, they do so with risk sincethere is very little evidence available yet to support that contention. It is entirely possible thatthe Iraqis chose not to fire their oil wells for their own reasons. Moreover, the PSYOP effortenjoyed far less success in encouraging Iraqi units to surrender. Clearly the regime respectedthe effort since Iraqi security forces worked hard to collect leaflets as quickly as they fell.Nonetheless, it is clear that on the whole, PSYOP produced much less than expected andperhaps less than claimed.Kinetic and electronic attacks to disrupt or destroy critical command and controlinfrastructure proved more effective. The continued dramatic improvement in the accuracy ofprecision-guided munitions afforded planners a scalpel that US forces applied throughout thecampaign. “Surgical strike” was a useful and accurate term in the conduct of IO in OIF. Themeans to conduct electronic attack also proved useful during the campaign. Even so, the Iraqismanaged to move some units and, on the whole, retained control over the country until groundforces physically took control of the centers of power. Following the end of major combatoperations, the regime’s survivors and perhaps others have shown resiliency and have beenable to mount a serious insurgency effort against the coalition. To do this they retained or built419
Page 3:
The United States Army inOperation
Page 6 and 7:
The Library of Congress Cataloging-
Page 9 and 10:
PrefaceOn Point is a study of Opera
Page 11 and 12:
AcknowledgementsHistorians prefer t
Page 13 and 14:
called him unkind names and questio
Page 15 and 16:
Table of ContentsForeword..........
Page 19 and 20:
Figure 78. 101st Airborne Division
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Table of Call Out BoxesThe SIPRNET
Page 25:
The 8 April Counterattack .........
Page 29 and 30:
Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athists
Page 31 and 32:
Army special operations soldiers, a
Page 34 and 35:
• Information and Knowledge. The
Page 36 and 37:
successful battles and engagements
Page 38 and 39:
timelines at the beginning of each
Page 41 and 42:
Chapter 1Operation DESERT STORM to
Page 43 and 44:
combat. The US Army’s AirLand Bat
Page 45 and 46:
The domestic political landscape in
Page 47 and 48:
was to experiment to anticipate cha
Page 49 and 50:
The authors also attempted to accou
Page 51 and 52:
The SIPRNET RevolutionIn addition t
Page 53 and 54:
efore World War I. 16 The extended
Page 55 and 56:
commanders to consider the battlesp
Page 57 and 58:
presence is not possible. Moreover,
Page 59 and 60:
• The Air Force’s C-17 Globemas
Page 61 and 62:
GAO Report. Military Transformation
Page 63 and 64:
On 20 September 2001, President Geo
Page 65 and 66:
All of these efforts led to a sweep
Page 67 and 68:
NOTES1. General Frederick M. Franks
Page 69 and 70:
Chapter 2Prepare, Mobilize, and Dep
Page 71 and 72:
joint organizations played central
Page 73 and 74:
Figure 10. Key coalition camps and
Page 75 and 76:
CLCC LOG and Title 10 PowerPoint pr
Page 77:
Figure 17. Tern delivers Army water
Page 80 and 81:
Pre-positioned EquipmentIn Europe d
Page 82 and 83:
allies in the region in providing s
Page 84 and 85:
organization to leverage joint inte
Page 86 and 87:
surprise but allowed a gradual buil
Page 88 and 89:
Figure 24. V Corps objectivesin any
Page 90 and 91:
that supported them, while denying
Page 92 and 93:
Webster and Spider Marks. Marine Br
Page 94 and 95:
V Corps Command Brief, 15 July 2003
Page 96 and 97:
V Corps Command Brief, 15 July 2003
Page 98 and 99:
completing its work in February. BC
Page 100 and 101:
Figure 32. Soldiers posing with a D
Page 102 and 103:
Figure 33. V Corps assault command
Page 104 and 105:
ight thing to do. More than 6,200 s
Page 106 and 107:
defense coordinator (TAAMCOORD), an
Page 108 and 109:
attalion leadership, with the USARE
Page 110 and 111:
The 18th MP Brigade, stationed in M
Page 112 and 113:
and environment of Iraq. They condu
Page 114 and 115:
proper mix of combat, CS, and CSS u
Page 116 and 117:
Given all that can go wrong, the pe
Page 118 and 119:
Jeremiah Johnson, Combat CameraFigu
Page 120 and 121:
opportunities such as a sudden coll
Page 122 and 123:
27. Major General Robert Blackman,
Page 124 and 125:
80. Lieutenant Colonel John Huey, p
Page 126 and 127:
Summary of EventsSaddam Hussein and
Page 128 and 129:
• Breaching the berm at the borde
Page 130 and 131:
humanitarian assistance supplies, w
Page 132 and 133:
Intelligence Supporting Operational
Page 134 and 135:
Moving the start of the ground camp
Page 136 and 137:
Figure 42. PSYOP leaflets distribut
Page 138 and 139:
Igor Paustovski, Combat CameraFigur
Page 140 and 141:
Figure 45. Comparison of Iraqi grou
Page 142 and 143:
to secure the first two primary obj
Page 144 and 145:
Crossing The BermThey are coming to
Page 146 and 147:
Figure 50. 3rd ID border breach sch
Page 148 and 149:
covering forces rapidly and simulta
Page 150 and 151:
After the aborted mission, morale s
Page 152 and 153:
act of passing the change of route
Page 154 and 155:
Figure 54. RRP EXXON and FARP SHELL
Page 156 and 157:
Air Base (An Nasiriyah), seize the
Page 158 and 159:
Figure 58. The 3rd BCT scheme of ma
Page 160 and 161:
also captured more than 200 EPWs, i
Page 162 and 163:
Figure 61. Division Central Collect
Page 164 and 165:
Figure 63. Distance from Objective
Page 166 and 167:
Figure 67. Routes of march north to
Page 168 and 169:
Staff Sergeant Dillard Johnson, 1st
Page 170 and 171:
did not see me and began to fire on
Page 173 and 174:
At 1430 on 23 March, 3rd BCT took c
Page 175:
During the fighting at As Samawah,
Page 178 and 179:
24. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jay Deh
Page 180:
FLOYD, Johnson’s platoon fought y
Page 183 and 184:
Army Spec. Joshua Earl,a military p
Page 185:
April 1, 2003, black smoke rises fr
Page 193:
US Army photoSgt. 1st Class Anothon
Page 197 and 198:
Chapter 4The March Up-CountryI don
Page 199 and 200:
Figure 74. March up-country sequenc
Page 201 and 202:
working in the LSA and units moving
Page 203 and 204:
Colonel Melvin Frazier, who command
Page 205 and 206:
101st Abn Div AARFigure 78. 101st A
Page 207 and 208:
Courtesy of V CorpsFigure 80. 3rd I
Page 209 and 210:
All of the estimates accurately ass
Page 211 and 212:
decided to break his convoy into tw
Page 213 and 214:
Figure 86. The 507th route of movem
Page 215 and 216:
Figure 87. The 507th Maintenance Co
Page 217 and 218:
With 3rd BCT, 3rd ID securing the l
Page 219 and 220:
However, employing LRS is not a Lon
Page 221 and 222:
the attack on Baghdad. Practically
Page 223 and 224:
Marcone and Grimsley justifiably ex
Page 225 and 226:
Figure 92. Ambush Alley—officiall
Page 227 and 228:
advantage in fighting in the dark.
Page 229 and 230:
Robert Woodward, US ArmyFigure 93.
Page 231 and 232:
Figure 95. Chemical soldiers from t
Page 233 and 234:
all of them. From a broader perspec
Page 235 and 236:
While never perfect, the Army and e
Page 237 and 238:
Figure 96. 11th AHR attack scheme f
Page 239 and 240:
Still, the regiment planned routes
Page 241 and 242:
Moreover, with less than half of th
Page 243 and 244:
Figure 99. Apache attack helicopter
Page 245 and 246:
her husband had been shot and was i
Page 247 and 248:
AdaptationsFollowing the attack, Ar
Page 249 and 250:
PlanningThe planned 101st attack ag
Page 251 and 252:
The 2-101st intended to attack the
Page 253 and 254:
Page 255 and 256:
Figure 107. 3rd ID’s scheme to en
Page 257 and 258:
followed. The third tank, Lieutenan
Page 259 and 260:
the division elected to block the e
Page 261 and 262:
3-73-7CAVCAVFightingFightingininAnA
Page 263 and 264:
Figure 112. Relief in place of 3-7
Page 265 and 266:
enemy as they had at As Samawah. Ar
Page 267 and 268:
Figure 114. Lieutenant General Wall
Page 269 and 270:
airborne assault, the units had beg
Page 271 and 272:
From 29-30 March, the 82nd conducte
Page 273 and 274:
Page 275 and 276:
Company at Checkpoint Charlie, subo
Page 277 and 278:
towns during the five simultaneous
Page 279 and 280:
Figure 124. PSYOP leaflets to minim
Page 281 and 282:
The 173rd’s combat capability als
Page 283 and 284:
moment. The ground had been plowed
Page 285 and 286:
The brigade also jumped with a high
Page 287 and 288:
Figure 129. TF 1-63 AR Abrams tank
Page 289 and 290:
NOTES1. Captain Michael Matthews, O
Page 291 and 292:
59. Colonel Rodney Mallette, MTMC,
Page 293 and 294:
133. Oliver.134. Marcone.135. Ibid.
Page 295:
202. Colonel Blair Ross, A Transfor
Page 298 and 299:
to Baghdad in the east, and the I M
Page 300 and 301:
Figure 133. Objectives in the vicin
Page 302 and 303:
crossed a river or entered the maze
Page 304 and 305:
three brigade combat teams, 1st BCT
Page 306 and 307:
paid off in spades. ThroughoutI’v
Page 308 and 309:
Figure 135. Enemy disposition in th
Page 310 and 311:
ack toward Baghdad, and began condu
Page 312 and 313:
Figure 140. Sample district council
Page 314 and 315:
virtually every type of mission pos
Page 316 and 317:
Lieutenant General Wallace on theFi
Page 318 and 319:
Figure 144. Objective MURRAYabout I
Page 320 and 321:
Figure 145. Enemy and friendly disp
Page 322 and 323:
The Approach: Isolating An NajafAft
Page 324 and 325:
Page 326 and 327:
130th Engineer BrigadeFigure 149. E
Page 328 and 329:
When his battalion attacked into to
Page 330 and 331:
The FeintAt 0600, the Thunderbolts
Page 332 and 333:
on the way to Al Hillah. Accordingl
Page 334 and 335:
that the adversary seldom behaves a
Page 336 and 337:
learned from the 3rd ID, SOF troops
Page 338 and 339:
The protracted fighting in As Samaw
Page 340 and 341:
Figure 156. The scheme for the isol
Page 342 and 343:
Launching the AttackHaving rearmed
Page 344 and 345:
IN and the tactical command post—
Page 346 and 347:
Electronic attacks against enemy co
Page 348 and 349:
Figure 164. TF 3-69 AR attacks to s
Page 350 and 351:
The Smoke Mission at Objective PEAC
Page 352 and 353:
Figure 166. 2nd BCT attacks to Obje
Page 354 and 355:
Figure 168. Iraqi tank burning in t
Page 356 and 357:
Accelerating the AttackDuring this
Page 358 and 359:
The ApproachTrue to his word, Grims
Page 360 and 361:
V CorpsFigure 171. Civilian aircraf
Page 362 and 363:
First Lieutenant Mark Schenck, writ
Page 364 and 365:
Essayons: Sergeant First Class Paul
Page 366 and 367:
to one of the road craters at appro
Page 368 and 369:
Figure 177. Platoon leaders of Apac
Page 370 and 371:
Figure 179. The 3rd BCT Objectives
Page 372 and 373:
TF 2-69 Armor, the brigade’s main
Page 374 and 375:
Sanderson led from the front near t
Page 376 and 377:
caught fire and ammunition began to
Page 379 and 380:
NOTES1. Anthony H. Cordesman, The I
Page 381 and 382:
61. Ibid. 2-70 AR; and Lieutenant C
Page 383 and 384:
131. 2nd BCT, 3rd ID, 3. See also L
Page 385 and 386:
Chapter 6Regime Collapse“There ar
Page 387 and 388:
Figure 184. Attack to BaghdadBaghda
Page 389 and 390:
Actions ElsewhereAs the corps’ an
Page 391 and 392:
While some soldiers worked to help
Page 393 and 394:
[of Saddam Hussein] were located. T
Page 395 and 396:
These soldiers collect and process
Page 397 and 398:
As the situation developed during t
Page 399 and 400:
Despite the relative ease of their
Page 401 and 402:
Mason Lowery, US ArmyFigure 190. TF
Page 403 and 404:
Thunder Run of 7 AprilTask: Attack
Page 405 and 406:
warrant. 40 If conditions wereGoing
Page 407 and 408:
they came upon them, passing them o
Page 409 and 410:
Figure 195. TF 1-64 AR movement int
Page 411 and 412:
Figure 197. The 2nd BCT disposition
Page 413 and 414:
dazed. The explosion and fires prod
Page 415 and 416:
Specialist Gates took it it and ran
Page 417 and 418:
Task OrganizationOn the evening bef
Page 419 and 420:
LARRY, and Gator would secure the n
Page 421 and 422:
The Pros from Dover—Special Force
Page 423 and 424: About the same time as Johnson move
Page 425 and 426: Rage faced dismounted Republican Gu
Page 427 and 428: Firing on all Cylinders— —Engin
Page 429 and 430: Figure 206. The Iraqi counterattack
Page 431 and 432: Figure 207. The Iraqi counterattack
Page 433 and 434: Silver Star RecommendationSpecialis
Page 435 and 436: NOTES1. Anthony H. Cordesman, The I
Page 437 and 438: Post). This information comes from
Page 439 and 440: Chapter 7ImplicationsSoldiers, sail
Page 441 and 442: OIF demonstrated that the COE is no
Page 443 and 444: from the War in Iraq.” The Russia
Page 445 and 446: Bank and Gaza provided grist for Ar
Page 447 and 448: Although urban operations in OIF pr
Page 449 and 450: Fort Irwin “replicated” the ene
Page 451 and 452: level did have satellite communicat
Page 453 and 454: The evidence of OIF does not compel
Page 455 and 456: Of course, building a doctrine and
Page 457 and 458: also find ways to achieve interdepe
Page 459 and 460: Special Forces in ActionOn 20 20 Ap
Page 461 and 462: Liaison between Army special forces
Page 463 and 464: Simply stated, operational maneuver
Page 465 and 466: petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL
Page 467 and 468: Logistics SuccessesThere are some g
Page 469 and 470: Following the incident, the Army la
Page 471 and 472: Grouping so many capabilities in th
Page 473: The efficacy of net-enabled means t
Page 477 and 478: There are some obvious OIF implicat
Page 479 and 480: Most tactical unit commanders claim
Page 481 and 482: NOTES1. JFCOM and TRADOC are moving
Page 483 and 484: Chapter 8TransitionPeace enforcemen
Page 485 and 486: On Point has not been able to deliv
Page 487 and 488: I Guess I Made an ImpressionThis fi
Page 489 and 490: him the opportunity to honor his cl
Page 491: NOTES1. General Peter J. Schoomaker
Page 494 and 495: DESERT STORM as commander of VII Co
Page 497 and 498: Combined Forces Land Component Comm
Page 499 and 500: Facilities Engineer Team410th Milit
Page 501 and 502: 244th Theater Aviation Brigade (OPC
Page 503 and 504: Facilities Engineer Detachment BFor
Page 505 and 506: Detachment/Marine Light Attack Heli
Page 507 and 508: Detachment/Marine Aerial Refueler/T
Page 509 and 510: 4th Light Armored Recon Battalion (
Page 511 and 512: 10th Logistics Planning Augmentatio
Page 513 and 514: 315th Tactical PSYOP CoTactical PSY
Page 515 and 516: Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aerial Veh
Page 517 and 518: 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry DivisionH
Page 519 and 520: Tactical PSYOP Team 221/362nd Tacti
Page 521 and 522: Control Ground Station Team 5/5/D/3
Page 523 and 524: Ground Surveillance Systems Platoon
Page 525 and 526:
Eagle-Intel/Analysis and Control El
Page 527 and 528:
A/326th Engineer BattalionTeam 1/27
Page 529 and 530:
Elements/4th Air Support Operations
Page 531 and 532:
864th Engineer Battalion (-) (Comba
Page 533 and 534:
HHC (-)/22nd Signal Bde17th Signal
Page 535 and 536:
51st Movement Control Detachment (D
Page 537 and 538:
HHC/418th Quartermaster Bn59th Quar
Page 539 and 540:
507th Medical Co (Air Ambulance) (A
Page 541 and 542:
AMC Logistics Support Element FWD -
Page 543 and 544:
381st Military Police Detachment (E
Page 545 and 546:
513th Transportation Co (Medium Tru
Page 547 and 548:
249th Quartermaster Co (Repair Part
Page 549 and 550:
946th Transportation Co (Medium Tru
Page 551 and 552:
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 2
Page 553 and 554:
Glossary A2C2AAAAAMDCAASLTABC-BLABC
Page 555 and 556:
C1C2C2C2XC2PCC3C4C4ISRC5C6CACACOMCA
Page 557 and 558:
EUCOMEXORDF/AFAFAIOFARPFBCB2FIFFIST
Page 559 and 560:
JLOTSJOEJOPESJRACJRTCJSOTFJSOTF-NOR
Page 561 and 562:
OBJODAODSOEFOHOIFOIF-SGO/OOOTWOPCON
Page 563 and 564:
SOCCESOCCENTSOCOMSOFSOPSPSPACECOMSP
Page 565 and 566:
BibliographyInterviews, Discussions
Page 567 and 568:
Group InterviewsInterview with CFLC
Page 569 and 570:
Dilanian, Ken. “Airborne Jumps In
Page 571 and 572:
Joint Publication 4-01.8. Joint Tac
Page 573 and 574:
• 335th Theater Signal Command•
Page 575:
Lieutenant Colonel David Kolleda.
Page 578 and 579:
103 Military Intelligence Battalion
Page 580 and 581:
603rd Aviation Support Battalion ·
Page 582 and 583:
General, USMC, Chief of Staff, CFLC
Page 584 and 585:
Davis, Wilbur, Staff Sergeant, USA,
Page 586 and 587:
Operations Officer, National Ground
Page 588 and 589:
219, 223, 243, 278, 296, 314, 331,
Page 590 and 591:
198, 284, 315Objective RAMS · 102,
Page 592 and 593:
427, 430, 518Schwartz, Eric ‘Rick
Page 594 and 595:
USS Higgins, Aegis Destroyer · 65,
Page 598:
The United Strates Army in Opera
show all

On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?