On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

surprise but allowed a gradual buildup of combat forces in the Persian Gulf region that exertedpressure on the Iraqi regime and its military forces. While the possibility of strategic surpriseevaporated, opportunities for operational and tactical surprise remained.Although no one in the command thought the regime would immediately collapse underthe pressure of simultaneous attacks along multiple lines of operation, CENTCOM did attemptto create the conditions that might produce a sudden collapse. Planners thought it possible thatthe combination of effects from Tomahawk missiles, air attacks, ground attacks, and robustinformation operations would either render the regime irrelevant or cause it to collapse veryearly in the fight—in effect, like a balloon pops when poked. There were three iterations ofplanning based on differing sets of conditions. Each included the idea of simultaneous attackfrom the air and on the ground, with the number of units available as the key variable. Plannerslabeled the first option “generated start,” which assumed a buildup of forces until all the forcesrequired had arrived in theater. Since no one could be sure whether or when they would betold to go to war, planners developed a “running start” option, which assumed launchingcombat operations with minimum forces and continuing to deploy forces and employ themas they arrived. The final option stemmed from wargaming the running start. The hybrid planreflected an assessment that the minimum force required reached a higher number of troopsthan envisioned in the running start option. In the end the plan reflected a compromise solutionbetween the hybrid and running start options that provided more forces than planned in therunning start, but fewer than estimated as required for the hybrid plan. Although most ofthose officers developing the plan would have preferred the simultaneous attacks afforded bythe “hybrid” plan, they perceived the possibility of achieving operational surprise by way ofthe “running start.” Further, operational surprise could offset the risks inherent in sequencingforces into the fight. 32The number of forces required to conduct the operation was the single most importantvariable around which all of the variants revolved. The end was never in question—remove theregime; but the specific method, or way, required to achieve this strategic goal was the subjectof contentious debate. Without agreement on the way—simultaneous or sequential—thererarely was agreement on the amount of force or means required. Yet, correctly balancing mass,surprise, and sustained operations kept the two (way and means) entirely interrelated. Theamount of available force affected the proposed course of action, which invited reevaluationsof force requirements. This friction is not uncommon and can be found in virtually everymodern US campaign. In the end, CENTCOM and CFLCC successfully concluded majorcombat operations with the forces allocated. 33General Scheme of ManeuverBoth General Tommy Franks at CENTCOM and Lieutenant General Dave McKiernan atCFLCC wanted to avoid making the main effort along the direct approach between the Tigris andEuphrates rivers. This approach is not only the obvious and most heavily defended approach;historically, armies using this direction of attack had been defeated. Also, the planners hadconcerns about Saddam’s ability to flood the valleys, limiting coalition mobility. Yet to close onBaghdad from all directions required CENTCOM to commit forces into the Tigris-Euphratesvalley to mount an attack along the Tigris to approach Baghdad from the east. Coming up theEuphrates also posed problems. Forces advancing along the southern approach would have to46