On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

working in the LSA and units moving on the LOC could do so unmolested. Isolating An Najafdeveloped into one of the hardest-fought actions in the campaign, eventually absorbing twoBCTs and the division cavalry. In the end the 3rd ID handed An Najaf off to the 101st AirborneDivision. Elsewhere, the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company demonstrated the dangeron the ever-lengthening LOCs.While fighting continued along the corps’ axis of advance, the CFLCC continued tobuild the logistics and sustainment base necessary to support extended combat operations inand around Baghdad. While perhaps not as exciting as the combat operations, these actionswere among the most complex and critical to ensuring the campaign’s overall success. Thefighting in An Nasiriyah and As Samawah demonstrated the risk paramilitary forces posed tothe LOCs. With 1st Armored Division unavailable to secure the LOCs as planned, McKiernanand Wallace had to find a way to secure the LOCs. Ultimately, McKiernan released the 82ndAirborne to V Corps and Wallace committed it, along with the 101st, to clean up the enemyforces that threatened to interdict the LOCs.The march up-country included a series of combat and support operations to set the tacticaland logistic conditions necessary to secure the corps’ rear area and isolate Baghdad. Adding tothe complexity and risk, the region suffered through a sandstorm of biblical proportions. Thefour major events described in detail are: 5• The use of Army attack aviation in deep attacks• The battle to isolate An Najaf• The operations to secure the LOCs• The airborne insertion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into northern IraqThese were, by no means, all of the operations that occurred during the march up-country.The coalition executed a series of parallel, sequential, and simultaneous operations across thetheater designed to increase the pressure on the Iraqis while moving the sustainment base forward.Following Turkey’s refusal to allow US combat forces to stage an invasion from its territory,CENTCOM and CFLCC determined to use the 4th Infantry Division in the south. Once on theground, the “Ivy Division” assumed a “follow-and-support” mission, coming up from Kuwaitbehind the 3rd ID and 101st Airborne Division, ultimately securing part of northern Iraq. Whilethe original plan was not executed, the extended threat of 4th ID attacking through Turkey mayhave fixed Iraqi conventional forces in the north, preventing them from repositioning southagainst V Corps and the MEF.Without the 4th ID operating from Turkey, the coalition instead employed a powerfulcombination of SOF, Kurdish forces, and conventional US forces in northern Iraq. Thisincluded the first US airborne operations mounted from the European theater since World WarII and 173rd Airborne Brigade’s first combat operation since the Vietnam War. These forcescontinued to fix the Iraqi forces well north. SOF units worked aggressively in the west andnorth to interdict any theater ballistic missile capabilities, isolate Iraq from neighboring Syria,and destroy strategic targets throughout Iraq.In addition to ground attacks from the south, CFLCC kept pressure on Baghdad andSaddam’s regime directly by keeping the 2nd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division, the theater145