On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

perimeter wielding a rifle. At Objective CURLY, the medics hunkered down, prepared to fightto protect the wounded. Medics and medical evacuation crews performed what some mightdescribe as miracles and did it with precision and compassion. Medical support troops foragedfor supplies, kept generators running, and did a host of other mundane but daunting tasks undersevere conditions. They too deserve to have their story told.Although On Point has been able to survey the tactical-level fighting in narrative form,it has not accounted for all of the tactical fights. For example, On Point reviewed the 82ndAirborne’s operations at As Samawah but did not discuss their subsequent operations. The 82ndfought important engagements aimed at securing the lines of communication and reducing AdDiwaniyah after As Samawah that are not covered here but warrant examination. Similarly,there are numerous tactical engagements that deserve further investigation and more thoroughaccounting than possible in On Point. To complete the story, junior officers, noncommissionedofficers, and soldiers need to tell their stories. Junior officers and noncommissioned officersand their troops carried the tactical fights that produced success. They have a contribution tomake to the body of knowledge regarding combat operations—their accounts will inform theway we train and educate soldiers and their leaders.On Point tantalizes, but does not deliver on the many and varied tactical actions of specialoperations forces. Their story clearly needs telling. The sheer diversity of special operationsforces will make their story complex, but to understand really what happened in OIF theiraccount is absolutely essential. Similarly, joint and Army intelligence efforts could not beexamined fully here—that effort must come later. As it becomes possible to do so, assessingthe success of intelligence efforts needs to be done.At some point it will be possible to develop a reasonably clear sense of what the Ba’athistregime’s leadership intended and how it directed execution. That accounting and the thinkingand efforts of the Iraqi military leadership will enrich understanding of US vulnerabilities andsuccesses. Determining the composition and intent of the paramilitary forces that operated inOIF will probably be more difficult. The effort to understand their motivation and operationswill be essential to understanding the campaign from the perspective of the Iraqi military andparamilitary alike. More important, such an effort will help the services consider implicationsof the campaign that may apply elsewhere.Finally, there are two important general accounts that should be undertaken from the Armypoint of view. On Point will need to be revised once Iraq operations are better understood, whenunits that fought major combat operations return from Iraq and are able to update their ownhistories, and when participants are more readily available for follow-up interviews. The secondeffort is more important—that is the history of operations since 1 May. Collection of data forthat effort is under way by the Center of Military History, but that work cannot be completedand the story cannot be written until operations against the insurgency are concluded.434