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On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

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NOTES1. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Wash<strong>in</strong>gton DC: TheCenter for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 85-104. Re: declaration of air supremacy see 104.2. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, commander, CFLCC, <strong>in</strong>terview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot,US <strong>Army</strong>, Retired, 8 December 2003.3. Major E. J. Degen, Major Kev<strong>in</strong> Marcus, and Major Lou Rago, notes taken when <strong>the</strong>y accompaniedLieutenant General Wallace to Jalibah.4. McKiernan, 8 December 2003.5. Colonel William Grimsley, commander, 1st Brigade, 3rd ID, <strong>in</strong>terview by Lieutenant Colonel DavidMann<strong>in</strong>g, undated.6. Lieutenant General William Wallace, commander, V Corps, summary transcription of <strong>in</strong>terview byColonel French Maclean, US <strong>Army</strong>, 15 April 2003.7. Memorandum for Record, TF 2-70 AR, <strong>Operation</strong> IRAQI FREEDOM Timel<strong>in</strong>e, 22 May 2003.8. Ibid.9. “V Corps Commander’s <strong>Operation</strong>s Assessment,” 7 April 2003.10. “<strong>Operation</strong> IRAQI FREEDOM—By <strong>the</strong> Numbers,” CENTAF-PSAB, KSA, Commander’s ActionGroup, 9th Air Force, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, 30 April 2003.11. Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Sanderson, commander, TF 2-69 AR, <strong>in</strong>terview by Lieutenant Colonel DavidMann<strong>in</strong>g, 12 May 2003. “A2C2, [<strong>Army</strong>] Airspace Command and Control, is broke across <strong>the</strong> American <strong>Army</strong>. It isespecially critical when you are fir<strong>in</strong>g artillery, MLRS. Those are th<strong>in</strong>gs most people will catch. If you are do<strong>in</strong>g aMLRS strike on someth<strong>in</strong>g, okay, somebody will clear <strong>the</strong> A2C2. If you are down to cannon artillery and you aredo<strong>in</strong>g call for fire for fire support, nobody will catch that and <strong>the</strong>y won’t clear <strong>the</strong> airspace. And God help you ifyou are fir<strong>in</strong>g mortars because <strong>the</strong> mortar is obviously go<strong>in</strong>g to go above <strong>the</strong> hard deck and it really is “big sky, littlebullet” <strong>the</strong>ory and you could knock someth<strong>in</strong>g out of <strong>the</strong> way.”12. “Battle of Debecka Ridge Summary Brief,” Colonel Michael Beasock, TRADOC Systems Manager forClose Combat Missiles, US <strong>Army</strong> Infantry School, Fort Benn<strong>in</strong>g, GA, undated.13. Sergeant First Class Frank R. Antenori, US <strong>Army</strong> Special Forces, email to Lieutenant Colonel ArthurDurante, US <strong>Army</strong>, Retired, 22 August 2003.14. “Battle of Debecka Ridge Summary Brief.”15. Antenori.16. Capta<strong>in</strong> Shane Celeen, commander, C/2-70 AR, <strong>in</strong>terview by Capta<strong>in</strong> Michael Ma<strong>the</strong>ws, 22 July 2003.17. Ibid.18. Ibid.19. <strong>Iraqi</strong> actions took place <strong>in</strong> such a convoluted command and control environment that it is hard to discernpatterns of operation. The Republican Guard, regular army, and militias were controlled separately. Understand<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Iraqi</strong> actions also is complicated by <strong>the</strong>ir efforts to shield and deceive coalition forces. Sometimes forces on <strong>the</strong>scene reacted to an attack and were jo<strong>in</strong>ed almost serendipitously by militias. When coalition <strong>in</strong>telligence detected aunit or detected movement, <strong>the</strong>y attempted to determ<strong>in</strong>e what <strong>the</strong> enemy <strong>in</strong>tended. Sometimes <strong>in</strong>telligence estimated<strong>in</strong>tentions correctly. The po<strong>in</strong>t is that merely detect<strong>in</strong>g movement or <strong>the</strong> presence of a unit does not offer <strong>in</strong>formationas to <strong>in</strong>tent. F<strong>in</strong>ally, as of <strong>the</strong> time <strong>On</strong> <strong>Po<strong>in</strong>t</strong> went to press, very little actual <strong>in</strong>formation on <strong>Iraqi</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentions andactions was available. The Jo<strong>in</strong>t Center for <strong>Operation</strong>al Analysis at Jo<strong>in</strong>t Forces Command is do<strong>in</strong>g some work onthis matter, which ultimately may help clarify what <strong>the</strong> <strong>Iraqi</strong>s believed was happen<strong>in</strong>g and what <strong>the</strong>y were do<strong>in</strong>gabout it.20. Field Manual 100-5-1/Mar<strong>in</strong>e Corps Reference Publication 5-2A, Organizational Terms and Symbols,HQ Department of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Army</strong>/<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Mar<strong>in</strong>e Corps, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, DC, 30 September 1997, 1-66.21. V CORPS FRAGO 149M, “Limited Attacks,” to OPORD 0303-343 (Cobra II), Headquarters, V Corps ,Camp VIRGINIA, Kuwait, 300700ZMAR03.22. 2nd BCT, 3rd ID, “History of <strong>Operation</strong> IRAQI FREEDOM or How to Own a Country <strong>in</strong> 30 daysor Less.” The unit history states that Objective MURRAY was <strong>in</strong> Habbaniyah, but it is actually <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> town of AlHidiyah about halfway between Karbala and Al Hillah on <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> route between <strong>the</strong> cities.23. Ibid. See also “3-7 CAV Unit “History; and “3-7 CAV Command Brief<strong>in</strong>g” by Lieutenant Colonel TerryFerrell, 25 May 2003.24. “Historical Account,” 1-9 FA, <strong>Operation</strong> IRAQI FREEDOM, undated, 5.25. “Battle summary, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, <strong>Operation</strong> IRAQI FREEDOM,” 9 June 2003.26. “Unit history, 10th Eng<strong>in</strong>eer Battalion,” 1 May 2003.323

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