On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

from the War in Iraq.” The Russians found much to learn from and, perhaps more important,much to fear. The academics and soldiers present, like V. K. Nair before them, did not perceivethat Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a benevolent activity. One of them, Major General G.A. Berezkin, asserted that OIF represented “the first steps on the path toward the establishmentof Washington’s absolute hegemony in the world.” 5 Beyond noting the clear and present dangerthat the US constituted to the rest of the world, Berezkin asserted that the United States haddeveloped a new form of operations. To Berezkin the integration of joint forces, coupled withprecision munitions, had reached a new plain requiring the “invention” of a term to describethem adequately. According to Berezkin, that new form of warfare is “joint operations.” 6The Russians found much to applaud from a military point of view in what they perceivedto be innovation, adaptation, and effective use of information and an integration among theservices that is new. On the other hand, they were critical of Iraq’s performance and believedthat the Iraqis had the means to defeat US forces in the field. General of the Army M. L.Gareyev argued that the Iraqis did not effectively defend the approaches to Baghdad. Heargued that “With thorough camouflage, combined with a large number of decoy targets andminefields, they (troops defending the approaches to Baghdad) could have played an importantrole in repulsing the invasion of the Anglo-American troops.” 7 Gareyev also argued that Russiacould learn from the US experience in combating guerilla warfare. For example, US operationsin Iraq suggested to him that Russia should train and organize units to operate in “maneuverintensiveraids” and that greater attention must be paid to “reliable protection for lines ofcommunication, command and control posts and logistics.” 8 For the most part, these Russianobservers did not believe the coalition handled urban warfare well and felt that a well-executedurban fight would give the US pause. The Russians also noted with satisfaction that the US didnot achieve the “contactless” battle that it sought. More important, some argued that the UShas a weakness stemming from the effort to fight contactless battles—they perceive that the USmay be vulnerable to close combat. 9There are still other possible lessons for outsiders that US forces need to anticipate. Thepoint is as the Defense Department moves on transformation, the operational environmentremains dynamic and so must the transformation effort. Equally important, friends, adversaries,and even some who are neither will seek ways to cope with perceived US strengths and exploitperceived US weakness. Adapting to stay ahead promotes adapting to keep up or get ahead. Forexample, what might outside observers conclude from the CFLCC’s effort to build infrastructureto support the arrival and staging of units? Perhaps they will determine that denying or limitingaccess is the key to surviving—or at least extending—a conflict to attain a favorable diplomaticsolution. US transformation must occur in the context of considering what potential USadversaries might have learned from OIF. This is the essence of understanding the implicationsof the contemporary operating environment and the future operating environment.PreparationThe preparation of the theater and ongoing operations since DESERT STORM provedessential to rapid tactical and operational success in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The USstaged ground forces primarily in a comparatively robust theater infrastructure. Despite the factthat coalition forces could not stage in either Saudi Arabia or Turkey, they enjoyed the benefitsof continued presence in the theater that their predecessors in the Gulf War did not. It is hard387