On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athists from power. The strategic goal included establishinga stable, secure, prosperous, peaceful, and democratic Iraqi nation that is a fullyfunctioning member of the community of nations. 1 Within this context, the end of majorcombat operations did not signify the end of combat or operations, just the transitionto the next phase of the long-term campaign.• Phase I. Preparation secured regional and international support, degraded theIraqi regime’s ability to resist, established the air bridge and secure lines ofcommunications (LOCs) to the theater, sought to interdict tactical ballisticmissiles (TBM) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and alerted,deployed, and postured American forces. In short, this phase set the conditionsto neutralize Iraqi forces.• Phase II. Shaping the Battlespace included posturing coalition forces toconduct sustained combat operations, beginning initial operations to degradeIraqi command and control and security forces, and seizing key pieces ofterrain. These actions were in addition to the ongoing diplomatic and counter-TBM/WMD operations.• Phase III. Decisive Offensive Operations marked the beginning of conventionalcombat operations. It included the air campaign, preparatory ground operations,and the attack north to Baghdad. This phase culminated with securing Baghdadand removing Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist regime from power.• Phase IV. Post Hostilities operations encompass the transition from combat tostability operations and support operations, including humanitarian assistanceand reconstruction. Interestingly, planners realized early on that as coalitionforces liberated sections of Iraqi territory, operations in those sections wouldtransition to Phase IV while Phase III combat operations continued elsewhere.This ‘rolling transition’ to Phase IV is the hallmark of true full-spectrumoperations and is one of the defining characteristics of this campaign. Thedistance between forces conducting Phase III and Phase IV operations variedfrom meters to miles, requiring remarkable flexibility, initiative, and maturityof the leaders and soldiers.The Army: On Point in Operation IRAQI FREEDOMDuring the 12 years since DESERT STORM, the Army and the other servicesattempted to adapt to the post-Cold War era, adopt lessons learned during operations,anticipate changes or trends in the operational environment, and finally to takeadvantage of technologies that could improve combat capability. On Point addressesseveral skeins of effort in this adaptation and evolution of capability.For example, soon after Operation DESERT STORM, the Army realized the potentialof information-based warfare. 2 The Army transformed whole divisions into adigitally linked force capable of waging network-centric warfare, designing and buildingForce XXI on the hypothesis that digital links would increase the tempo of groundoperations and thus the lethality and survivability of ground forces. Blue Force (friendlyunits) Tracking (BFT), a system that provided commanders a picture of where theirxxiii