On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

toward Al Hillah appear to have deceived the enemy into believing that the US would attackalong Highway 8 as well as through the Karbala Gap. Lieutenant Colonel “Rock” Marconerecovered the map below (see insert pg C-10) from the body of the 10th Brigade MedinaDivision reconnaissance company commander at Objective PEACH. The map shows clearlythat the 10th Brigade thought the main attack was coming from the south, with supportingefforts from the west and through the Karbala gap. The red circle in the center of the map isthe bridge at Objective FLOYD. V Corps’ action at that location clearly drew the attention ofthe Iraqis, who, either in response to V Corps or for reasons of their own, began repositioningartillery, armored, and mechanized infantry forces, which made them vulnerable to air attack.The corps and coalition air strikes destroyed dozens of individual systems and defeated severalunits. The Iraqis also defended their flank with only a reconnaissance battalion, no match forthe “Marne” Division’s march on Baghdad.The 2nd BCT, 3rd ID Attacks Objective MURRAY (30 March – 1 April)The attack to MURRAY aimed to“cause the enemy to reposition forcesand reinforce deception objectives.” 21But as the first of the corps’ fivesimultaneous attacks, it actually beganon 30 March when 2nd BCT of the 3rdID attacked northeast of RAMS to clearthe enemy from some restrictive terrainFeintA feint, according to the Joint Army-Marine CorpsManual for Operational Terms and Graphics, is “a typeof attack used as a deception to draw the enemy’s attentionaway from the area of the main attack. Feints mustappear to be real and therefore require contact with theenemy.” 20and rock quarries and to position itself for the attack on Objective MURRAY the following day.The Spartans attacked with TF 1-15 IN and TF 3-15 IN abreast to clear the quarries north ofObjective SPARTANS and to seize key intersections leading to a bridge over a canal outsideof Al Hindiyah. 22The ApproachEn route, the task forces met light resistance until nearing Al Hindiyah, where TF 1-15 INdestroyed several technical trucks and dismounted Fedayeen. The 2nd BCT maintained contactwith the enemy and destroyed several artillery, armor, and infantry units hiding in the quarries.Upon reaching their limit of advance, the lead task forces established a secure position westof Al Hindiyah, designated Objective SPARTANS 2. The remainder of the BCT closed on theobjective and prepared for the attack on MURRAY the next day. The 3-7 CAV passed to thewest of 2nd BCT and established a screen along the division’s flank at Phase Line DOVER. 23The 2nd BCT also repositioned its direct-support artillery. The 1-9 FA moved to PositionArea Artillery (PAA) NIXON, approximately 30 kilometers south of Karbala and east ofHighway 28, to provide fires in support of 2nd BCT’s planned attack on MURRAY. Thebattalion arrived in NIXON at 1008 and immediately received a call for fire against a platoonsizeenemy force in the quarries at SPARTANS 2. Accurate artillery fire killed most of oneIraqi squad and convinced the rest to surrender. 24 With the fight at SPARTANS 2 complete, theartillery and remainder of the brigade continued to prepare for MURRAY.Starting 31 March, the 6-6 CAV of the 11th AHR provided one troop of AH-64 Apachesto 3rd ID as a quick-reaction force. The helicopters would address 3rd ID’s concerns about thethreat posed by any bypassed enemy forces on its eastern flank. Specifically, the division worried261