On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

completing its work in February. BCTP managed this unplanned addition to its training loadwithout canceling other events, including both routine training and special events planned toaccommodate anticipated operations.Unit and Soldier TrainingAs the soldiers flowed into the theater, they quickly completed the reception and stagingprocess and moved out to the various camps and facilities in the Kuwaiti desert. However,rather than relaxing in the not-yet-too-hot sun, most of the troops embarked on an aggressiveindividual and collective training program to further hone their combat skills. Although it wasfar away from their families and the comforts of home, the Kuwaiti desert offered vast trainingspace. Moreover, with the Army gearing up for combat, the usually scarce training resources—ammunition, time, and fuel—were abundant.Lieutenant Colonel John Charlton assumed command of 1-15 Infantry Battalion in July2002. His battalion, part of the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, had already completeda six-month rotation in Kuwait, returning to Fort Benning, Georgia, in October 2002. Theyredeployed to Kuwait in January, and their efforts are representative of the typical trainingregimen for units in 3rd ID:TF 1-15 IN arrived in Kuwait on 9 January 2003 and immediately moved to CampNEW JERSEY, located deep in the Kuwaiti desert. After the soldiers got their feetunder them in the crowded camp, they moved out to a bare spot in the desert, designatedAssembly Area MAINE, about 20 km from the border with Iraq. The soldiers spentthree austere months in hard training with daily force-on-force exercises, live fires,urban combat training, and operating in a chemically contaminated environment. Thetask force took advantage of the extensive live-fire ranges at the Udairi Range complexas well as the numerous mock-up villages and trench complexes. Additionally, thesoldiers learned how to use the bevy of new equipment that the Army acceleratedthrough the procurement process to bring to the field. While the soldiers and juniorleaders trained relentlessly, the staff and senior leaders continued to plan and preparefor the task force’s expected missions. As they moved closer to D-day, security relaxedand the soldiers were “read on” to their specific missions. The platoons and companiesthen went through as many rehearsals as time would allow. The six weeks of trainingwent far to build the critical esprit de corps that the soldiers would rely on in thepending combat. 51Prepare—Equipping the ForceIn the fall of 2002, the Army senior leadership was convinced that war with Iraq wouldcome early in 2003. General Shinseki used the opportunity provided by the annual 4-Star ArmyCommanders’ Conference to assemble key corps, division, and separate regiment commanders.Shinseki used the conference to determine requirements and assign priorities. The conferencealso provided Lieutenant General McKiernan the opportunity to describe to his potentialsubordinates his vision for the campaign that lay ahead. Due to extremely tight securitymeasures during the initial planning, many of these commanders learned for the first time thattheir units were among those anticipated for use in the mission. The conference also gave thesecommanders the opportunity to coordinate directly with the senior Army staff to articulate their58