On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Figure 155. 82nd Airborne attacks in and around As Samawahand confirming the superiority of US forces at night. The 3-325 AIR found that moving intopositions at night to engage enemy forces when they moved at first light was an effective tactic.These probing attacks typically provoked Iraqi mortar and RPG fire, but the paratrooperscountered with mortar and artillery fire of their own, with much greater effect. The firstnight’s combat resulted in 14 enemy KIA and 3 WIA at a cost of one American WIA. Moreimportant, the brigade developed intelligence with each of these attacks. Generally, the heavytroops developed information on Iraqi TTP that saved the infantry from learning it on foot orin HMMWVs. 81The AttackBeginning on the morning of 30 March, the brigade conducted a series of simultaneouslimited attacks from the east, west, and south of the city. Colonel Bray based his plan onintelligence the brigade S2, Major Michael Marti, assembled from earlier operations, thespecial forces teams, and from local Iraqi citizens. These attacks and the earlier probes resultedin the brigade learning the local patterns of operation. According to Major Marti, these patternswere straightforward. At the outskirts of town the Iraqis, and perhaps some Syrians, employedsuicidal attacks. In the city they fought house to house, employing human shields, and near thebridge over the Euphrates the paramilitary troops employed RPGs fired in volleys and mortarsregistered on the road and bridge. Marti observed, “They never changed the way they fought, sowe were able to use appropriate tactics to counter. Fighting started at 0800 local every day andthen stopped at 1800. It was like they were punching a clock like Wile E. Coyote in the cartoon.” 82Marti believed that the intelligence overlay provided to the 2nd Brigade by the 3rd ID’s 1-30IN proved invaluable in helping to discern patterns they could exploit. Based on what they279