On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Grouping so many capabilities in the realm of information operations and the moregeneral theme of information and knowledge complicates discussing them, but seems essentialto preserve the essence of their interdependence. So while no attempt is made to separatethe various components that merit discussion for purposes of organization, they include thefollowing general areas.• Toward Netcentric Warfare• Information Operations• Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceToward Netcentric WarfareInformation has always enabled warfare, and the fight to protect information and to gaininformation has always been critical to success in battle. DESERT STORM and subsequentoperations vividly demonstrate the power of information. The Global Positioning System (GPS)enabled coalition forces in DESERT STORM to maneuver with confidence across the tracklessexpanse of the Iraqi desert. Simultaneously, Tomahawk cruise missiles and laser-guided bombsstruck targets with seemingly unerring accuracy. Leveraging the power of information becameone of the central tenets of the 1990s’ Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the defenseestablishment’s campaign to continue US dominance in warfare.Theorists, pundits, and decision makers, both within and outside the military, began toexamine the opportunities to transform America’s military forces into an information-age force.What evolved was a concept known as Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The proponents ofnetcentric warfare perceived revolutionary change in how warfare would be conducted. Tonetcentric warfare theorists, warfare would no longer be about fighting for terrain or to destroyforces, but would instead be a fight for information. Whoever won the fight for informationwould win all conflicts. For traditional theories of warfare, such as that of Clausewitz, theysubstituted new constructs such as systems theory, chaos and complexity theory, and nodalwarfare. Each of the services also saw the net as a means to empower commanders and unitswith information. Service initiatives, including Army digitization and Force XXI, the AirForce’s Effects-Based Operations, the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement, and Marine Corps SeaDragon, all sought to move from Industrial-Age warfare toward what Alvin and Heidi Tofflertermed “Third Wave Warfare.”But what does this mean? Is the net really only about information and the amount of itthat can be made available to commanders? There is at the heart of netcentric warfare animportant concept—that anyone on the network has the information, the means to act on it,and the authority to do so. Netcentric warfare, then, is not about moving digits and ever-largercommunications pipes, but rather a self-adapting system of thinking participants who are ableto act rapidly on the basis of understanding both the commander’s intent and the situationaround them. The focus then is on waging war and not on the net as an end in itself. It ispossible to lose this distinction in the pursuit of the means to move the digits. 33The Army’s evolution toward a digitally net-enabled force actually began long before theemergence of the concept of NCW. In the 1980s, the Field Artillery branch led the Army intothe information age with the adoption of TACFIRE as the means to coordinate and executefire missions in a digital network. TACFIRE provided the Army both a proving ground for415