On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

The following morning, Delta Company, the scout team, and mortars did the necessaryreconnaissance and handoff with TF 1-41 IN. Lieutenant Colonel Denton did his ownreconnaissance and conferred with the commander of TF 1-41 IN as well. The remainder of hisbattalion arrived on the 28th. At 1600 that day, 1-293 IN assumed the mission, thus becomingthe first ARNG infantry battalion since Korea to enter combat as a unit. It was not the last.Ultimately all but one of the seven ARNG infantry battalions deployed into Iraq. 64ConclusionAt the end of the march up-country, the corps had reached positions from which to launchnorth through the Karbala Gap and begin the isolation of Baghdad. The LSA at ObjectiveRAMS was well on the way to achieving full operational capability, and the CFLCC had freedup the 82nd Airborne Division and the 2nd ACR (L) to start cleaning up the threat along thelengthening LOCs.Although many perceived the war as “in a pause,” V Corps and I MEF did not ceaseoperations. V Corps continued to fight in several directions, from As Samawah to An Najafand elsewhere to defeat the mix of paramilitaries and conventional forces to set the conditionsrequired to attack to Baghdad. I MEF was doing much of the same within its zone, and bothcorps were busily transitioning their support structures forward to support future operations tothe north. The fighting to protect the LOC revealed the real nature of the Iraqi defense. Corpsunits adapted their fighting techniques to match. Immediately behind the fighting, soldiersquickly transitioned to stability and humanitarian relief operations while they tried to stabilizethe liberated areas. The 11th AHR, which conducted the first Army aviation deep strike of thewar, learned that its tactics were inappropriate and helped lead the effort to adapt appropriately.And finally, a sandstorm of biblical proportions swept through the theater, shutting down mostaviation and inhibiting ground maneuver.Elsewhere in the theater, JSOTF-North supported Kurdish attacks toward Kirkuk, Irbil,and the vital oil facilities in the region. In the west, the JSOTF-West searched for surface-tosurfacemissiles and WMD while denying the Iraqis the use of the entire western desert. SOFtroops in JSOTF-West or in TF 20 seized a key dam and several airfields. Taking the damprotected V Corps and I MEF from a deliberate inundation, while seizing the airfields extendedJSOTF-West’s reach across the barren desert regions. Finally, the CFACC transitioned fromits initial strategic air focus to concentrate on destroying the Iraqi ground forces. With a levelof air-ground integration not seen before, the CAS and air interdiction operations destroyedthreatening Iraqis and enabled ground maneuver.During the march up-country, the implications of the scope and scale of the campaignbecame apparent. Reaching operational ranges greater than anything the US Army hadexecuted since World War II, the speed and distance started to tell on the Army’s logisticsand combat support systems. While never out of fuel, ammunition, or food and water, thesystems designed to deliver repair parts, tactical communications, and tactical intelligencesupport faltered under the strain. Moreover, after the initial coalition surge up-country, theenemy actions influenced events and to some extent forced the CFLCC to adjust. Soldiers, ofcourse, immediately adapted and continued toward their objectives. Behind and beside them,the logistics troops demonstrated that they too could get the job done under difficult conditions.178