On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Some have argued that what happened to the 507th is easily explained. They assert that the507th was poorly led, poorly trained, and poorly disciplined. Others said that the 507th reflecteda CSS culture of lackadaisical approach to security and that this never could have happened toa combat unit or to their CS or CSS unit. These are possible explanations. Another possibilityis that the 507th is indicative of an Armywide problem. This view holds that the some CS andmost CSS units are generally not equipped, manned, or trained to defend themselves whilestationary, let alone when on the march. CSS units are generally the last units to field nightvision, armor plating for “flak” vests, and other combat gear. They also have fewer radios,crew-served weapons and far less armor protection than their colleagues in combat and CSunits. Finally, they do not get either the focus or resources to conduct tactical simulations orlive-fire training that their colleagues in combat and CS units receive.None of this is a problem if the 507th is a singular example of a poorly equipped, poorlytrained and poorly led unit. Nor is it a problem if the Army expects to operate with cleardemarcation between “front” and “rear.” If, however, the 507th is indicative of an Armywideproblem in training, equipping, and manning CS and CSS units, and if the Army expects tooperate in a nonlinear, noncontiguous operational environment, Army leaders may need toexamine everything from culture to equipment in CS and CSS units. Equally important, theArmy should examine any concept that envisions operations in nonlinear and noncontiguousbattlespace to determine how forces should be manned and equipped to operate in the so-calledwhite spaces and on LOCs. Assuming that technical means of surveillance will protect thoseunits may not be justified. The culture and expectation in the Army should be, to borrow aphrase from the Marines, that every soldier is a rifleman first, and every unit fights.Despite these criticisms, Army CSS soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officersovercame one of the most challenging campaign situations possible to meet the needs of thewarfighting units that defeated the Iraqi armed forces and removed the Hussein regime. Theydid so through dedication, courage, and innovation that overcame any obstacle in their path.General Dave McKiernan offered the best testimony to the logistics troops when he noted on1 May 2003, “the truth of the matter is we did not stop operational tempo because of any classof supply, and what was accomplished was never impeded by logistics, and I think that is aremarkable story.” 32Information and KnowledgeThis broad domain cuts across every other area discussed. Developing and communicatinginformation and generating knowledge from information are at the heart of what the Armyand other services tried to achieve in the years since DESERT STORM. Attempting toleverage information to maneuver out of contact with the enemy and to apply overmatchingcombat power at a time and place that US forces choose is at the heart of emerging joint andArmy concepts. Communications technology, information technology, and how units arestructured and equipped are all part and parcel of implications on information and knowledge.Effects-based operations and joint integration also stem from the ability to share informationand knowledge. Effects-based operations, including the ephemeral domain of informationoperations and subsets such as perception management and electronic attack, are concernedwith information and knowledge as well.414