On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

27. Major General Robert Blackman, chief of staff, CFLCC, interview by Brigadier General Robert Cone, 17and 31 March 2003.28. Ibid.29. Major General J.D. Thurman, C3, CFLCC, interview by Colonel James K. Greer, 25 April 2003. See alsoMajor General J. D. Thurman, C3, CFLCC, interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 21 May2003. Specifically, Thurman recalled they had to train the staff to conduct a battle update assessment.30. Benson.31. Major Kevin Marcus, G3 planner, V Corps, email to Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, 8 September 2003.32. Benson.33. Ibid.34. An operational planning team (OPT) formed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, spring 2002, in supportof the Army Staff and CENTCOM for the purpose of examining the logistic considerations for deployment andsustainment of Army forces through the three axes of advance (Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey). Briefing prepared bySAMS Deployment OPT, undated, held in Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.35. Major E.J. Degen was later promoted to lieutenant colonel by Lieutenant General Wallace in Baghdad on26 April 2003.36. In October and November 2002, SAMS deployed a team of six students to Heidelberg, Germany, toassist V Corps in planning the Baghdad operation. These students planned side by side with the V Corps staff in anexample of the successful marriage of education and actual operations. On Marine participation, see email Rago toDegen, 5 January 2003. According to Rago, the marines brought a “platoon” of planners to every planning sessionto assure the MEF understood the plan and could collaborate effectively.37. See Dr. Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End (Fort Leavenworth,Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2001). Colonel Greer’s white paper essentially formed the core of the conceptthat V Corps built in preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Dr. Russell Glenn is a Rand analyst who haspublished a number of studies on urban operations. A frequent speaker at the School of Advanced Military Studies,Glenn enjoys wide respect in the Army and in the USMC. A retired Army officer, graduate of School of AdvancedMilitary Studies and a past faculty member, Glenn’s major publications on urban operations include several Randstudies, the most important of which is Heavy Matter: Urban Operations Density of Challenges (Santa Monica, CA,RAND, 2001). See also Tom Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Non-Linearity in Military Affairs(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998). Dr. Joe Strange’s ideas on critical vulnerabilities are detailed in Joe Strange,Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting No. 4, 1997.38. Major E. J. Degen from notes taken at the CENTCOM Component Commanders’ Conference held atCamp DOHA, Kuwait, September 2002.39. Much of this paragraph is planners’ “tribal wisdom” but facts cited stem either from list of graduates ofSchool of Advanced Military Studies or from Benson.40. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, commanding general, CFLCC interview by Major John Aarsen, 30November 2002.41. Ibid.42. Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Degen to Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 12 November 2003.43. Ibid. See also Lieutenant General David McKiernan, commanding general, CFLCC, interview by MajorJohn Aarsen, 19 December 2002. See also Benson.44. V Corps G3 Plans notes. Major John Aarsen, 19 December 2002.45. “CFLCC OPLAN COBRA II Base Plan,” Camp DOHA, Kuwait, 13 January 2003.46. Exercise timelines referenced from V Corps/CJTF-7 Standard Operations Brief, or MOAB (Mother of AllBriefings), 12 July 2003.47. General Shinseki came to this conclusion while at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during a visit to the Pre-Command Course. Shinseki received a briefing on “The Way Ahead for Urban Operations” from Lieutenant GeneralJames Riley, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center, and his staff. The CSA determined to publishFM 3-06, Urban Operations, immediately and to distribute it to the field with priority to troop listed units. Second,he directed that TRADOC field a mobile training team to educate the field in the new urban operations doctrine,including both joint and Army doctrine.48. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), formed in the late 1980s by General Carl E. Vuono,CSA, originally focused on providing flagship training for divisions and corps. In the beginning BCTP includedtwo operations groups (A and B), each commanded by a colonel. Subsequently, BCTP formed Operations GroupC to support the training of Army National Guard brigades as part of the Army’s effort to improve training in the82