On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

TF 1-64 AR, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip DeCamp, seized RAMS againstlight resistance and then spent several hours clearing the area. Ultimately the task force foughtoff counterattacking Iraqi forces throughout the night, using direct fire, indirect fire, and CAS toretain the critical terrain on RAMS. The Iraqis used tactics similar to those 3-7 CAV experiencedat As Samawah—suicidal attacks using RPGs and civilian vehicles against armored vehicles.Paramilitary forces swarmed all over RAMS in civilian trucks. They also fought from spiderholes along Highway 28 in the restrictive terrain. 34After destroying morethan 20 vehicles and killingapproximately 350 paramilitaries,2nd BCT securedRAMS by 2245 but hadnot cleared it of all enemydefenders. The brigade humanintelligence teams immediatelyinterrogated 27captured EPWs. The questioningrevealed the localenemy unit to be Ba’athParty militia sent to secure aradio tower in RAMS and todefend against an expectedairborne assault. They werecompletely surprised to seearmored vehicles that farnorth so early in the war.Though poorly trained, themilitia fought fanatically,The Iraqi Defense at Objective RAMSThere were two types of enemy [at RAMS], the Fedayeen wearingblack pajamas, and the regulars. I would not have known a Fedayeenfrom a regular at that point. . . .We captured some of their officers. They were expecting an attackfrom the sky, with the 82nd dropping in. They thought there wasgoing to be an airborne drop. They positioned their forces as such.Two days before the fight, a general came in and said this is theoverview of the land, and left. The next day, the officers came in anddrew a circle on the ground, mapping out where defensive positionsshould be, and then left. Then the soldiers came in. About 6 hoursafter the soldiers came in, we (TF 1-64 AR) came in.There was no [command or control] for these guys; they werefighting independently. You could literally see a circle on the groundwhere the officer had drawn for the RPG guy to shoot from; that isexactly where he died. They were in a wedge formation; I rememberseeing five guys in a wedge…that is where they died.Lieutenant Colonel Eric “Rick” Schwartz,Commander, TF 1-64 AR,interview, 18 May 03occupying the brigade throughout the night. By 1000 on the 23rd, 2nd BCT had cleared theenemy from RAMS itself and turned its focus to defending against the steady flow of counterattackersstreaming out of An Najaf. The 2nd BCT would remain at RAMS until called on torelieve 3-7 CAV south and east of An Najaf two days later. 35Long-Range Surveillance TeamsThe 2nd BCT did not attack into RAMS blindly. In addition to estimates developed priorto crossing the line of departure, V Corps attempted to insert reconnaissance deep on RAMSitself. V Corps has a unique, specialized capability to conduct sustained surveillance of an areato support decisions and targeting. Running counter to the trend for high-technology systemsand remote sensors, the corps’ long-range surveillance (LRS) company consists of the corps’most elite infantrymen, whose mission is to go deep into enemy territory and maintain constant“eyes on” a key piece of terrain. LRS teams are trained in infiltration, hide-site construction,enemy equipment and tactics, advanced communications, and a staggering host of survival andevasion skills. The selection process is brutally competitive to ensure only the very best, mostcapable, and experienced soldiers make the team. The small LRS teams are the corps’ only allweather,24-hour-a-day capability to watch a critical piece of terrain.162