On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

joined the fray, destroying more than 300 vehicles or weapon systems ranging from air defenseartillery to “technical” vehicles. 55After the second armor raid, 1st Brigade maneuvered rifle companies using the sectorsthey had designated. They attacked deep into An Najaf against Saddam Fedayeen strongpoints, seizing important buildings and destroying massive amounts of captured equipment,ammunition, and weapons. Attacking the town from the north, the 2nd Brigade employedsimilar techniques with similar results. Coordinating the attacks, the division established a limitof advance to prevent fratricide as the two brigades converged. By the end of the day on 4 April,the 101st Airborne Division controlled An Najaf. What remained was to assure security and totransition from fighting on one block and handing out MREs on the next to assuring securityand conducting stability operations and support operations. 56In An Najaf, the division started its adaptation to the enemy at hand. It learned from 3rdID and subsequently from its own attacks in An Najaf, Al Kifl, and Al Hillah. At Al Kifl, thesoldiers validated what they learned here—they “allowed the tanks to react to the initial smallarmsfire [and then maneuvered] the infantry against the enemy once contact was made.” 57Eventually, the division fought in eight different cities, noting that each required slightlydifferent approaches based on the terrain and prevailing conditions. But the essential lesson ofthese urban fights was that integrating combined arms, heavy and light forces, armored raids,and a liberal application of precision airpower applied in each case. 58 Their tactics evolvedrapidly as the troops adapted to the enemy, and these fights proved useful as “dress rehearsals”for subsequent operations in Baghdad and elsewhere.The 101st Airborne Division Feints toward Al Hillah (31 March)After 2nd BCT took control of the bridge at Objective JENKINS, V Corps ordered thedivision to conduct a feint toward Al Hillah some 25 kilometers north. Accordingly, the 101stassigned this mission to Colonel Anderson and his 2nd BCT. Part of Lieutenant GeneralWallace’s five simultaneous attacks, he intended for the feint to mislead the Iraqis as to thedirection and composition of the main effort. By attacking north, the feint also would support3rd ID’s attack at Objective MURRAY. Thus, the division had to attack with sufficient forceand for a sufficient duration to convince the Iraqis it was serious.Task Organization and PlanningSince TF 2-70 AR was already at JENKINS and organized as a task force of two combinedarmscompany teams, Colonel Anderson assigned this mission to Lieutenant Colonel Ingram’swell-traveled Thunderbolts. To support the feint, the division provided AH-64 Apaches from3-101 AVN. Anderson’s direct-support artillery, 1-320 FA, now composed of four 105mmhowitzer batteries and a reinforcing 155mm howitzer battery, joined the fight as well. Ingramcalled this operation “Thunderbolt Fake.” Although there was little time to plan, Ingram, whocolleagues describe as unflappable, was not dismayed. In his mind, this is what tank battalionsdo. As he put it, “tank battalions are great at reacting. The NTC prepares you for that.” 59The light infantry seemed undismayed as well. Their training also included combined heavyand light forces. For his part, Ingram believed that his attached light infantry company was “oneof the best organizations I’ve seen. . . .with those guys behind me, I never had to look back. Iknew where they were and what they were doing so. . . I could focus on the stuff to my front.” 60273