On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Under Alexander’s direction, INSCOM moved to integrate and synchronize its vastcapabilities to meet the CFLCC and V Corps requirements. The 18 months from 11 September2001 to 19 March 2003 mark the “operationalization” of INSCOM to support the soldiers inthe field. 63 Alexander instituted often twice-daily video teleconferences with the subordinatecommanders and eventually included representatives of the CFLCC and V Corps. His mainpurpose, aside from improving synergy and integration, was to “find out where the data sits [inthe national intelligence community] and getting it to V Corps.” 64Through the various subordinate commands, INSCOM leveraged the information andcapabilities of the nation’s various intelligence agencies. For example, through the hard workof Army military intelligence experts such as Chief Warrant Officer 5 Walter Price, LieutenantColonel Alexander Cochran, and Lieutenant Colonel Ian French, the NSA was a full partnersupporting the soldiers in the field. They served as the points of contact to whom intelligencesoldiers “reached back.” 65Moreover, under the close direction of the operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel DavidGrogan, the NGIC shifted from its historic mission of long-term analysis to developing a highlyfocused knowledge center concentrated on tracking the Iraqi Republican Guard, conductingdetailed hydrology studies in support of the CFLCC, and analyzing urban areas, includingBaghdad. NGIC created products that anticipated specific requests from the field and adjustedits hours to assume the theater’s battle rhythm. To ensure a responsive relationship, it dispatchedliaison officers, including Captain Ruey Newsom to CFLCC and Major Mike Bowling to VCorps. Specialized collaboration software allowed analysts in Kuwait to work with NGIC’sanalysts in real time. Regular secure video teleconferences augmented the communications andcooperation between NGIC and the theater. 66US Army EuropeWithin Europe, INSCOM’s 66th Military Intelligence Group, commanded by Colonel GusGreene, Sr., added its capabilities to support the forces deploying from—and through—Europeto Southwest Asia. In addition to the ongoing requirement to support Army operations in theBalkans, the 66th surged to help meet the deploying forces’ requirements. As the Europeantheater intelligence support unit, the 66th cooperated with America’s European allies to provideforce protection and counterterrorism intelligence support to the units moving through Europe. 67First and foremost, the 66th, and specifically 2nd MI Battalion under Lieutenant ColonelHugh Smith, had to plan and provide counterintelligence support to V Corps’ deployment fromGermany along ground lines of communication at convoy support centers, and at sea and air portsof debarkation in Germany, Belgium, and Italy. The 66th’s counterintelligence troops focusedon counterintelligence and force protection requirements. Moreover, the 66th simultaneouslysupported out-load requirements in the European Central Region while supporting deployablecounterintelligence, all-source, and specialized communications capabilities to Joint TaskForce Cobra in Israel, Joint Task Force Free Iraqi Forces in Hungary, Army Forces-Turkey,JSOTF-North, the 10th Special Forces Group, and 173rd Airborne Brigade. The group’smilitary intelligence detachments, located throughout USAREUR, had “pre-established directcoordination and liaison procedures with their supporting area support groups and base support67