On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Following the incident, the Army launched a series of investigations and studies to determine thecause of of the the tragedy. Determining why why Captain King King did did not not understand that that he was he was to transition to transition fromRoute from Route BLUE BLUE to Route to Route JACKSON JACKSON is one is aspect. one aspect. One possible One possible cause is cause that is he that joined he joined the 600-vehicle the convoy vehicle under convoy the under control the of control the 3rd of Forward the 3rd Forward Support Battalion, Support Battalion, 3rd ID, after 3rd its ID, rehearsals. after its rehearsals. It is unclear Itif is there unclear was if any there requirement was any requirement or time for or him time to back-brief for him to the back-brief plan to the demonstrate plan to demonstrate that he understood that hewhat understood his unit what was his required unit was to do. required to do.A second contributing factor is the ad hoc nature of the convoy and a lack of realistic tactical roadmarch training. The 3rd 3rd FSB FSB is a is tactical a tactical support support battalion battalion that that trains trains at the at NTC. the NTC. There, There, logistic logistic troops“fight” troops to “fight” defend to defend their support their support areas and areas even and their even convoys. their convoys. However, However, the 507th the belongs 507th belongs to a Patriot to aunit Patriot that unit gets that no gets opportunities no opportunities to undergo to undergo the same the highly same highly realistic realistic combat combat training. training. The 507th The 507th nevertrained never trained at any of at any the Army’s of the Army’s combat combat training training centers: centers: the NTC, the the NTC, JRTC, the JRTC, or the CMTC. or the CMTC.A third contributing factor may be the distances, routes, and the duration of operations. Out of of radiorange with the 3rd FSB and eager to catch up, Captain King and the 507th took the shortest, mostdirect route to get to Highway 8 on 22 March. This shortcut, only 15 km cross-country, took 5 longhours to travel with trucks designed for paved roads. However, the entire convoy had already traveledcross-country to reach the point from which he departed, so what seems like a bad decision now mayhave looked prudent to King on the evening of the 22nd. Farther behind, the 507th finally reached thetraffic control point at the crossover of Routes BLUE and JACKSON, but no one was directing traffic.Soldiers were present at the traffic control point, but they made no effort to turn the 507th and so,King, believing he was to continue on Route BLUE, drove past the turn and headed into An Nasiriyah.Some commentators have wondered why the 507th did not fire on the armed Iraqis they passed on theway into An Nasiriyah. One reason may have been that the soldiers were expecting to be greeted as asliberators. Moreover, the rules of engagement (ROE) were not as clear as they might have been. Withsome 13 sections detailing when one could fire, the ROE card concluded with guidance to to “attackenemy forces and military targets.” These ROE are clear enough when soldiers are well rested andwhen one is certain he is in hostile territory, but if the situation is ambiguous and soldiers becometired and lost, then they might, as those in the 507th did, choose not to fire. Even if if they had fired onfirst contact, the outcome is not certain. What is clear is that once Captain King and First SergeantDowdy recognized they were in a hostile environment, they locked and loaded and assumed the worst.Once the 507th entered the firefight, several other challenges hindered its defense. Several of of its itsweapons jammed repeatedly. The sole .50-caliber machine gun did not function at all. Nonetheless,they never stopped fighting. Soldiers who might have escaped went to the aid of those who wereinjured or whose vehicles had been disabled by enemy fire. Surrounded, they attempted to resist untilresistance seemed futile.Carl von Clausewitz would find none of this surprising. Nearly 200 years ago, he described exactlythe phenomenon that dogged the 507th. He would have described this chain of mistakes, confusionon the route, inadequate weapons maintenance, potentially confusing ROE, difficult terrain, and atraffic control point that no longer operated, as “friction.” Friction produced by humans, physicalconditions, and ambiguity, remain constants in warfare regardless of how sophisticated the technologyof war has become. The CSA understands this, as he demonstrated in his first message to the Army.On 1 August 2003, General Peter Schoomaker observed, “War is ambiguous, uncertain, and unfair.” 31 31The last point to recall about the 507th soldiers concerns the way they and the marines of Task ForceTarawa comported themselves. The marines did not pause to ponder why the 507th had been in in AnNasiriyah or wonder whether they should take responsibility for rescuing them. Rather, they honoredtheir predecessors’ exploits at Tarawa and launched north to rescue their fellow Americans. Perhapsthe lesson of the 507th soldiers stopping to help one another and the marines rescuing the survivorsare the best things to remember about this darkest day of OIF.413