On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

As the V Corps and I MEF fights inAn Nasiriyah, As Samawah, and An Najafprogressed, Lieutenant General McKiernanreached the same assessment that LieutenantGeneral Wallace had—it was time to slowdown and shift gears from the rapid movenorth to securing the areas already taken.Decisive FRAGO“82 ABN DIV (-): EFFECTIVE 260001Z MAR03,REPORT OPCON TO V CORPS.”CFLCC FRAGO 102 to OPORD 03-32262200Z [260100L] March 03McKiernan had already done what he could to provide the logistics resources and to ensurethat his two major tactical formations—V Corps and I MEF—had adequate maneuver room.McKiernan and his C3, Major General J. D. Thurman, now refocused their efforts on ensuringthat the I MEF and V Corps had the resources to control what they owned, particularly theLOCs. I MEF, although confronted with serious problems of its own, actually had more combattroops available than V Corps at this point. McKiernan had one remaining tool—the 82ndAirborne and its one brigade of three airborne infantry battalions—to add to the fight. The82nd’s planning priority was to reinforce early success by conducting airborne operations intoBaghdad should the Saddam regime collapse in the opening days of the war. By this time, itwas clear that contingency no longer applied. Accordingly, McKiernan released the 82nd to VCorps early on 26 March. 157 He also asked CENTCOM to accelerate the planned deploymentof one squadron of the 2nd ACR. In retrospect, McKiernan believed that giving V Corps the82nd was the most important decision that he made during the war. Wallace, McKiernan, andThurman independently reached the same conclusion. Thurman recalled that it was crucial thatthey “took the time to deal with the threat against their rear area.” 158Led by Major General Chuck Swannack, Jr., the storied 82nd Airborne would giveLieutenant General Wallace a combat-ready brigade with a division headquarters that couldcontrol additional units as required. Having Swannack and his headquarters was as important toWallace as having the troops that came with them. Wallace would assign them to the now-verylong LOC. With Swannack dealing with the LOC issues, the corps could focus on offensiveoperations across a growing and increasingly complex area of operations. General Swannackunderstood this as well. As early as 23 March, when it became clear that the regime wouldnot immediately collapse, Swannack contacted Wallace to see if the 82nd could contributeto the corps’ fight. This discussion set the corps and division planners into motion so that if,and when, the CFLCC released the division, it would know exactly where to go in the fight. 159Ultimately, the 82nd freed the corps to focus on continuing the attack. When the 2nd ACRarrived and joined the 82nd, the “All American Division” assumed responsibility for even moreground and began clearing and opening additional LOCs.In addition to the 82nd Airborne and the in-bound 2nd ACR, Wallace had additional internalresources to apply to the problem—the 101st Airborne Division’s maneuver brigades hadclosed in Kuwait and remained uncommitted. Originally, he had planned to apply the 101st’sunique air assault capabilities as a key element in isolating Baghdad, while the 1st ArmoredDivision would secure the LOCs and start transition operations. However, at this point in thefight, with 1st AD unavailable and with much of 3rd ID committed to securing the LOCs ratherthan attacking north, it was unclear if the corps would be able to bring enough combat power tobear on Karbala and Baghdad. The 101st would be of little value if the corps could not get its210