On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Webster and Spider Marks. Marine Brigadier General Chris Cowdrey, who joined CFLCC asdeputy C3, did a fellowship at SAMS that included one year of study and a second year on thefaculty, so he was both a graduate of and teacher in the Army’s course. All of this facilitatedparallel planning and reduced friction; as the planners came to know each other, they alsopassed on information, which they called “FLAGINT” or intelligence generated by their “flagor general officers.” 39The top tier of generals in the land component participated actively in the planningprocess. They worked closely with each other and with their own planners. McKiernan made apoint of assuring that he remained closely tied to Lieutenant General Wallace at V Corps and toLieutenant General Conway at I MEF. More important, McKiernan understood the operationaltasks CFLCC needed to accomplish and kept his staff on track. He coached his planners “not toplan the V Corps fight, not to plan the I MEF fight, but to shape (them).” 40 McKiernan wantedhis subordinate commanders to have “freedom of action within their zone,” so he focusedat the operational-strategic level and worked with his planners and his subordinates in a defacto, “adaptive planning process” that accounted for the dynamic variables in the theater. 41At V Corps, Wallace engaged frequently and at length with his planners in a comfortablerelationship, encouraging debate and issuing guidance as required. 42McKiernan had clear ideas on a number of important operational issues. For example, hedid not like the notion of sequencing I MEF and V Corps into the fight. An early iteration of theplan called for I MEF to lead the attack with a relatively small force composed of units from1st Marine Division and a BCT from 3rd ID. Ultimately a CENTCOM wargame confirmedMcKiernan’s view and the plan changed. McKiernan also wanted one commander in charge atBaghdad. Initially, he determined that Lieutenant General Wallace would command the forcesassaulting Baghdad. In the end, however, he divided the responsibility for Baghdad between VCorps and I MEF. Finally, in response to guidance from General Tommy Franks, McKiernanbegan considering how to open a northern front if 4th ID could not enter through Turkey. 43Prepare—Training the Staffs and SoldiersWith the chain of command and general scheme of maneuver emerging, the next step inpreparation included training the troops and headquarters. Preparing to operate at a scale andscope not seen since DESERT STORM with units not used to working together, a series ofexercises served to advance the planning and develop procedures, teamwork, and familiarityacross the divisions, corps, CFLCC, and CENTCOM. CENTCOM began to host a ComponentCommanders Conference monthly to build the team. The CFLCC commander ensured his majorsubordinate commanders also attended these events. These events not only enabled CENTCOMto convey guidance and information, they helped build the command team. Lieutenant GeneralWallace at V Corps began to build his team by hosting a seminar on command and control inAugust of 2002. The senior mentors of the seminar were General (retired) Fred Franks andhis VII Corps operations officer, Brigadier General (retired) Stan Cherrie, both of DESERTSTORM fame. The seminar included the commanders from all the subordinate divisions andseparate brigades that were matched against any possible war plans for Iraq.52