On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

On 19 March, Iraqi ground forces were in position to defend the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,weighting the eastern (Highway 6) approach to Baghdad with six divisions. Beginning atBasra, Iraqi formations echeloned along the Highway 6/Tigris River avenue of approach,with the 51st Mechanized Division south of Az Zubayr, supported by reinforcing armor to thesouthwest of the city. The 6th Armored Division defended from just north of Basra, with the18th Infantry Division in Qurnah, the 14th Infantry Division in Qurnah and Al Amarah, and the10th Armored Division in Al Amarah. Farther up the Tigris River, the Baghdad RG Divisionconcentrated at Al Kut, its brigades echeloned from northwest to southeast. 26 Along the westernEuphrates (Highway 8) approach, the 18th Infantry Division positioned the 704th Brigade inthe Rumaila oil field, along with elements of two RA armor brigades and an RA mechanizedinfantry brigade. The 11th Infantry Division defended An Nasiriyah and As Samawah to thesoutheast on the approaches to An Nasiriyah.Irregulars and Popular ForcesThe list of anticipated paramilitary forces included:• Saddam Fedayeen, “Saddam’s Martyrs”—fanatically loyal but relatively poorly trainedparamilitary forces• Al Quds—local militia, many of whom are Ba’ath Party members or responsive to Ba’athParty direction• Ba’ath Party militias; loyalists from the security services• Intelligence services• The Lions of Saddam youth organizationThese organizations prepared to fight as irregulars rather than as standing conventionalforces. The regime used many of these troops in the south, with approximately 2,000 operatingin Basra. Some assumed responsibility for defense of the urban areas along Highway 8 andthe Euphrates Valley, to include An Najaf (12,000-14,000 fighters) and Karbala (2,000-3,000fighters). Additional irregular forces operated in An Nasiriyah, As Samawah, and elsewhere. 27Unanticipated and not accounted for, other (non-Iraqi) paramilitary fighters entered the countryand turned up among the combatants.This extensive use of paramilitaries may have reflected an Iraqi plan to rely on a “populararmy” and on an effort to generate popular support for the defense of key urban areas. Therewere references in the Iraqi open press to Black Hawk Down and indications that the Iraqis werepreparing elements of this “popular army” to engage coalition forces in that manner. 28 Therewere significant amounts of cached arms and ammunition to support just such an effort—theregime clearly planned for their use, or at least intended to telegraph such a plan to observers. 29ConclusionV Corps and I MEF attacks across the border into Iraq demonstrated effective operationalplanning, flexibility, and agility. After building on 12 years of theater preparation, followed byapproximately nine months of planning, preparing, and deploying into the theater, coalitionarmed forces sought to liberate the Iraqi people, preserve Iraq’s natural resources, and supplant a30-year dictatorship. The ensuing campaign quickly achieved the first of several national goals—securing the Iraqi oil fields to preserve the future prosperity of the country. At the tactical level,the first 72 hours marked a lightning advance of over 400 km (in the case of Objective RAMS)101