On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

enemy as they had at As Samawah. Artillery had supported throughout, including 12 dangercloserocket missions, but CAS had provided the lion’s share of support with 182 sorties.In intense fighting the enemy managed to destroy two tanks and one Bradley. The divisionreported an estimated 2,000 Fedayeen killed and 100 “technical” vehicles destroyed. Moreimportant, they captured an Iraqi brigadier who commanded the southernmost of three militarydistricts in An Najaf. He reported he had lost most of his 1,500 fighters, but claimed 800 moreremained in the other districts. In any case, the division had reduced the flow of Fedayeensouth, and the fighting tapered off on 27 March. 154101st and 82nd relieve 3rd ID, 29-30 MarchAlthough Lieutenant General Wallace had hoped to avoid fighting in towns such as An Najafalong the Euphrates, he had anticipated the possibility. He “reasoned that the enemy wouldhave Al Quds, Fedayeen, and Ba’ath Party militia in the towns in a defensive set.” What he hadnot anticipated was their “tenacity and fanaticism.” 155 Wallace had also hoped to avoid a fight inAn Najaf, in particular, due to “cultural, religious, and historical” considerations. Containing,among other things, the Tomb of Ali, An Najaf is a significant holy site to the Shiite Muslims.However, the constant stream of attacks that threatened the logistics at RAMS requiredthat the corps continue to contain An Najaf. Similarly, attacks all along the LOC, and from AsSamawah in particular, required the corps to contain or isolate the towns. So far, two-thirds ofthe 3rd ID was consumed in containing the threat between these two towns. Locked into thisfight, the division could not disengage and prepare to lead the corps into Baghdad. The corpssituation reports effectively mark the change in view concerning the Fedayeen. Until 23 March,the enemy situation began with a review of what the corps knew about conventional units. On23 March, the tone changed, with the situation report noting that Fedayeen and “loyal securityforces…seem to be offering the most resistance.” 156 V Corps needed to solve this problem.Ultimately, Wallace asked for and received the CFLCC’s 82nd Airborne Division. He alsoemployed his 101st Airborne Division to relieve the 3rd ID. The 82nd relieved 3rd BCT at AsSamawah; the 101st relieved the 1st and 2nd BCTs at An Najaf.Lieutenant General McKiernan’s decision to release the 82nd stemmed from the largerstrategic decision to apply combat power to finally—and fully—secure the LOCs and enable thecorps to move decisively on Baghdad. The combination of the 3rd BCT’s continuing operationsfarther south, the intensity of the fight in and around An Najaf, and the challenge of consistentlyand securely running logistics convoys all pointed to a need to deliberately secure the corps’area south to Kuwait. Secure LOCs were a fundamental precondition for the corps to launch itsattack on Baghdad. The decision to focus combat power on the LOCs was critical—arguablythe decision of the ground campaign—and deserves a detailed discussion.Securing the Lines of CommunicationThere was no discrete set of attacks on specific dates by which to neatly describe the fightto secure the LOCs. Moreover, no one at any echelon of command really viewed the LOC fightas a separate mission. Rather, it was viewed as part of the efforts to concentrate the force forthe coming attacks to isolate Baghdad, to assure the LOCs remained open, and finally, to dealwith several cities that the 3rd ID had bypassed in the march up-country.209