On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

digitization and an opportunity to understand the DOTMLPF implications of net-enabledwarfare. Following the lead of the artillery, each battlefield operating system (BOS) developeda digital command and control system. These disparate BOS communications tools were thenloosely integrated into a broader Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS).After DESERT STORM, the Army embarked on a deliberate effort to leverage the powerof information in warfare. In Force XXI, the Army sought to field nothing less than a digital,net-enabled force. Comparing a DESERT STORM tank battalion to a Force XXI tank battalionillustrates the magnitude of change the Army sought. A DESERT STORM tank battalionemployed four Fire Support Teams (FISTs) that were digitally connected through TACFIREto supporting artillery batteries. In contrast, a Force XXI digitized task force has 74 entitiesdigitally connected to supporting artillery batteries, including: FISTs, scouts, Abrams tanks,Bradley fighting vehicles, and dismounted infantry and engineers.The Army’s investment in digitization paid off in OIF, or rather showed promise. Armyunits fought enabled by a digital network that allowed them to see their units and theiractivities, which let to situational understanding. Confident that they knew the location oftheir units, commanders could decide rapidly where, when, and how they would be employed.Additionally, because of joint initiatives in communications and networking and the provisionof selected Army systems to other services, coalition ground forces could fight joint netenabledoperations.In OIF, a combination of command and control aids provided Army commanders timelyand accurate situational awareness of their units and their activities, which led to situationalunderstanding. BFT allowed them to pass to their subordinates orders and graphics necessaryto describe how they intended to fight. BFT supported joint operational commanders byproviding current positions of Army forces via the Global Command and Control System(GCCS). Similarly, other components of ABCS, when combined with join systems, enabledintegration of the “friendly” air picture.A typical artillery engagement in OIF illustrates the power of the network. When an Iraqitarget appeared, Army tactical forces in contact sent a digital call for fire through the AFATDS.The call for fire, including target description and desired effects, stimulated two simultaneousdigital processes at the controlling headquarters. The first involved clearing fires. Using BFT,the operations staff verified that no friendly unit occupied the targeted space. This capabilityvaried by unit depending on the how far down they had BFT. As a minimum, fire supporterscould usually verify clearance with a single radio call. Using accurate mapping systems, theeffects cell verified that indirect fires could be safely employed without endangering civilians orcreating collateral damage to protected sites such as mosques or schools. Using the AMDWS,representatives of Army aviation, air defense, and the Air Force ensured the artillery would notadversely affect air operations. While the effects staff cleared fires, the artillery used AFATDSto execute the fire mission. AFATDS determined the optimal firing unit for the commanderto approve or override. AFATDS also computed firing data for each howitzer, includingammunition type, range, direction, and number of rounds necessary to achieve the desiredeffect. Using these digital means, units routinely were ready to fire in less than a minute. Armynet-enabled tube artillery fires generally could be cleared and delivered in less than 2 minutes.416