On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Joint Integration and Support: Effectiveness, not EfficiencyPerhaps the biggest accolade on the relative success of joint integration is offered by theRussian observer cited earlier, who argues that in OIF the US armed forces executed a newform of warfare, “joint operations.” Obviously, that is the result of serious effort to improvejoint integration since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Much remains to bedone, but OIF shows how much has been achieved. The term “integration” used here differsfrom another term used to describe joint operations—interdependence. Integration is aboutcombining resources in such a way as to produce synergy or results greater than the sumof the parts. Integration does not suggest efficiency so much as it suggests effectiveness.Interdependence, on the other hand, does suggest efficiency and therefore the elimination ofcapabilities in one service that may be redundant if they can be provided by another service.There are instances where interdependence makes absolute sense, and one instance wassuggested in a preceding paragraph in the discussion on whether air power might enable theArmy to reduce the amount of artillery that it fields. However, it is not appropriate in this effortto mandate solutions, but rather to suggest what implications might be drawn. Accordingly,integration is the term used in this discussion rather than interdependence.Army Support to the Joint TeamBy law, the Department of the Army is not a warfighting organization. Instead, the Armyprovides trained and ready forces to combatant commanders. The Army also provides forcesto other services that enable economies across the Department of Defense. For example, theArmy provides special forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs units to the Marines orelsewhere as required by the combatant commander. Similarly, theater air and missile defenseunits extend land-based air and missile defense wherever the combatant commander requiresit. The same is true for certain kinds of support, including processing and securing enemyprisoners of war. The Army also provides port-opening, terminal management, and logisticsover the shore services and thus is a major contributor to JLOTS operations. Finally, the Armyprovides certain common user commodities to all of the services. For example, the Army isresponsible for providing fuel and bulk water to all forces ashore.The Army did all of this and more in OIF. It provided both mandated support and supportthat it volunteered to provide. More than 40,000 soldiers either supported the joint team or wereassigned directly in support of other services. Some 6,200 soldiers served in or supported theCoalition Force Special Operations Component Commander. More than 2,700 soldiers servedwith I MEF, doing everything from chemical reconnaissance to manning rocket artillery units. 18The Army and the Marine Corps also collaborated to solve serious logistics problems. TheMarine hose and reel system, the Army pipeline, and “bag farms” provided the means to assureadequate fuel reached Army and Marine ground units. Similarly, the Marine Corps providedair and naval gunfire liaison teams to the Army to assist the Army in requesting and employingNaval and Marine air.This campaign not only illustrated the power of the US armed forces, but also showedhow much more powerful the parts are when integrated rather than merely deconflicted. Thecampaign also suggests that the missions of the Army and Marine Corps may be converging.These two services should find more ways to collaborate and train with each other. They may400