On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

Figure 116. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions areas of operations along LOCsdaily staff meetings. This greatly aided in targeting the enemy command and control structure.The paratroopers quickly learned that the Iraqis in As Samawah were using schools, mosques,and hospitals as headquarters and logistic sites. They did not use radios to direct operations butinstead used runners to issue orders and coordinate combat actions. 171Colonel Bray and his troops knew that the enemy was equipped with mortars, light andheavy machine guns, and RPGs. . . lots of RPGs. After the AK-47, the RPG was the mostubiquitous weapon of the war. Based on the SOF and 3rd ID experience, the “All Americans”thought the Iraqis would operate in 3- or 4-man groups, often using civilian pickup trucks fittedwith automatic weapons. 172 Armed with information passed by 3rd Brigade, 3rd ID, and theSOF, the paratroopers immediately started probing As Samawah. TF 1-41 made the first enemycontact at As Samawah late in the day on 27 March, before it had officially assumed controlof the area. TF 1-41 IN maintained continuous contact from then on. Generally, TF 1-41 dealtwith small groups of Iraqis making forays against the US blocking positions, often in taxis orcivilian cars. TF 1-41 IN and other units in the brigade killed about 50 paramilitary fighters insimilar attacks each day that they occupied the triangular crossroads southeast of the city. 173On the night of 29 March, 3-325 IN and TF 1-41 IN mounted the first probes into the townfrom the southwest. In the process, the airborne and mechanized infantry developed familiaritywith each other and practiced light-heavy integration while gleaning information about theenemy and taking the fight to the Iraqis. Quickly, Colonel Bray’s paratroopers and mechanizedtroops shifted their effort from terrain-focused attacks to enemy-focused attacks. The brigade’soperations evolved into raids against specific enemy positions where the paramilitaries werecongregating. This kept the defenders off balance and unable to interfere with logistics traffic.214