On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

elocate to defend the roads leading from the airport to the city, southwest of LIONS. The8th Brigade of the Hammurabi Division remained north of Baghdad, with some elements ofthe Adnan Division cross-attached to defend the northern and northwestern approaches tothe city. Additionally, the 3rd ID estimated an additional SRG battalion and two brigades oflight infantry remained available to defend within Baghdad proper. Finally, they estimated anadditional 15,000 paramilitary fighters would defend the city itself. 140In response to enemy units moving south, the 3-7 CAV had established a guard position inthe vicinity of Objective MONTGOMERY, the intersection of Highways 1 and 10. Once 3-7CAV had completed its passage through 1st BCT at PEACH and TF 3-15 IN had relieved 1stBCT of responsibility for securing the bridges, 1st BCT could begin its attack. 141Because the Iraqis had managed to damage part of the bridge at PEACH, Blount directedhis engineers to open a second route over the Euphrates. The 54th Engineer Battalion, alreadycontrolling the crossing site, emplaced a ribbon bridge. 2nd BCT’s TF 3-15 IN arrived themorning of the 3rd to relieve TF 3-69 AR of the defense of the bridgehead. 142 The conditionswere now set for the 1st BCT to leave PEACH and attack to seize LIONS. TF 3-69 AR wouldlead the brigade, followed by TF 2-7 IN and then the remainder of the brigade.Advancing the timetable for the attack wreaked havoc on the already congested crossingsite. TF 3-15 IN was moving to relieve TF 3-69 AR from securing the bridge; TF 2-7 movedfrom north of HANNAH and passed over the bridge; and the medium ribbon bridge companymoved forward to place the ribbon bridge in the water. All of this took place as 2nd BCTcrossed the river. Consequently 1st BCT’s forces arrived piecemeal at LIONS—TF 3-69 AR,TF 3-7 IN, and then finally TF 2-7. Blount understood the risk he took in not waiting to clearthe traffic but felt the benefits outweighed the risk. 143Have a Good Fight - -The Decision to to Seize the the Baghdad AirportLieutenant Colonel Rick Carlson, as as the the 101st 101st Airborne Airborne Division’s Division’s liaison liaison officer officer to the to V the Corps V Corps TAC,TAC, was in was position in position to observe to observe Lieutenant Lieutenant General General Wallace’s Wallace’s decision decision to have to the have 3rd the Infantry 3rd Infantry DivisionDivision seize the seize Baghdad the Baghdad International International Airport. Airport.The corps staff had been debating several options for for the the attack but but had had not not yet yet made made a a firm firmrecommendation. There were contingencies for the 101st to to seize it it by by air air assault. The The staff staff had had been beenconsidering sending the 3rd ID, but there was a concern that that there there might might be be heavy heavy losses losses of of vehicles vehiclesand personnel in the dense urban setting.On 3 April, Major General Blount, the the commander of of the the 3rd 3rd Infantry Division, called called Wallace Wallace on onthe radio (monitored in the corps TAC) and and asked permission to to initiate an an attack attack on on the the airport airportimmediately. Blount insisted that the 3rd ID ID was was the the right right choice. He He told told Wallace, “Sir, “Sir, we we trained trainedfor this. . . We prepared for this…We’re ready for this. We need to go now.”There was a pregnant pause on the radio channel and and a hush hush in in the the TAC TAC as as everyone waited waited to to hear hearthe corps commander’s decision. After several seconds, Wallace broke the the suspense with with his his firm, firm,confidence-building reply. . . “Have a good fight. Victory 6, OUT.”Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Rick Rick Carlson, Carlson, 101st 101st Airborne Airborne Division Division liaison liaison officer officer to to V V Corps Corps interview interview by by Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Colonel (retired) (retired) Arthur Arthur Durante. Durante.301