On Point: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi ... - Boekje Pienter

three brigade combat teams, 1st BCT,2nd BCT, and 3rd BCT, respectively. TheRegime Isolation1st BCT would initially secure Objective“By the time we reached Baghdad we had conductedPEACH, the corps’ actual crossing nearly 500 physical destruction information operationssite over the Euphrates River. The 2nd missions on Iraqi command and control nodes, links,BCT would pass through PEACH and and decision makers. Information operations tookattack to seize Objective SAINTS, a away the Iraqi leadership’s ability not only to masskey intersection of Highways 1 and 8. combat power, but to govern [the] nation.”Following 2nd BCT through PEACH, 1stMajor Prentiss Baker,BCT intended to move due north on theCFLCC IO targeting officer,interview with Major Robert Foley.west side of Baghdad to seize LIONS, orthe Saddam International Airport (laterrenamed the Baghdad International Airport, or BIAP). Once relieved from the Karbala missionby the 101st, 3rd BCT planned to follow the rest of the 3rd ID and attack to seize ObjectiveBEARS, but later they refined the position of this objective and called it TITANS, to the northof the city. The marines, remaining under the I MEF’s control, would move up the east side ofthe Tigris and the Diyalah River, then cross the Diyalah and close the cordon at TEXANS andRAVENS.The defending Iraqis continued to reposition, desert, or die in place. By 1 April, the MedinaDivision—originally composed of two armored brigades, one mechanized infantry brigade,and supporting assets—was largely destroyed. On 3 April, V Corps assessed the Medina asbeing down to only three maneuver battalions but noted that the 15th Mechanized Brigade ofthe Hammurabi Division was on the move to “backstop the Medina” south of Baghdad. Thecorps also believed a brigade of the Nebuchadnezzar Division had moved to a position in thevicinity of Al Hillah. Through 6 April, the Iraqis continued to move units to the Karbala Gap-Al Hillah area to reconstitute their defenses in the south, but they also moved units to Fallujahto block V Corps attacks from the west. Eventually, units from the Adnan, Al Nida, and theregular army all maneuvered south and west to reinforce the approaches to Baghdad.Cleaning Up to the SouthAfter V Corps completed its operations to attack through the Karbala Gap, it left oneunfinished piece of business—cleaning up Al Hillah. After the 101st’s feint toward Al Hillahas part of the five simultaneous attacks on 31 March, it kept the town isolated. The divisiondeliberately did not force a fight and withdrew far enough to preclude being drawn into an uglyurban battle. Now, as the corps moved north some six days later, Al Hillah was the only part ofthe line running from the lake through Karbala to Al Hillah that had not been secured. Doingso would clear the last defenders that could interdict the Highway 8 approach to Baghdad. Itwould also protect the LOCs west of the Euphrates as the corps brought troops and suppliesup through the Karbala Gap. Most important, Al Hillah remained, as Wallace described it, a“hornets’ nest.” 6The 101st’s 3rd Brigade took the task in hand, leading off with a feint on 8April, employinga force built on Lieutenant Colonel Ingram’s TF 2-70 AR, Thunderbolts. Coming off an attackat Karbala on 5 April, the Thunderbolts had one day to prepare, continuing their growing248