TRIPLE HELIX noms.pmd

W-23When Triple Helix UnravelsDenis Gray, Eric Sundstrom, North Carolina State University, USALearning from Failure in Case Studies of Industry-University Cooperative Research CentersGovernment-led industry-university cooperative - "Triple Helix" - research organizations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997) continueto spread (Etzkowitz, 2008). Some use multi-level evaluation (Gray & Sundstrom, 2009) for continuous improvement andlearning (Gray, 2008). Overwhelmingly, evaluations of cooperative research centers (CRCs) tracked success indicators (Gray,2000) and success stories (e.g., Scott, 2007) more than failures. Yet considerable evidence points to prospects for learning atleast as much from technological (Petroski, 1994), social-organizational (Coelho & McClure, 2005), and personal (Shepherd,2009) failures.Toward learning from failure, we present 4 mini-cases from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) Industry / UniversityCooperative Research Centers (IUCRC) Program. Analyses focus on IUCRCs that successfully launched, operated at least afew years with NSF funding, then failed.Our goals are to identify: 1) Likely factors in IUCRCs and their environments that contributed to failure; 2) Common themes inIUCRC failures; and 3) Points of learning for Triple Helix .NSF IUCRC ProgramFrom the 1970s NSF offered small grants, research oversight, and on-site evaluation for IUCRCs; University scientists conductcooperative, pre-competitive research, funded and directed by representatives of industry member organizations who sharescientific knowledge. A NSF evaluator documents Center history and collects data for a national database.Since inception, the Program funded 110+ IUCRCs with initial 5-year awards, and many, second 5-year awards. McGowen andGray (2010) tracked IUCRCs no longer NSF-funded, and found very different success rates at Centers with less than 10 yearsof NSF funding (about one-third continued operating) than those funded 10+ years (about two-thirds continued).Cases of Early FailureCenter L. Launched in the mid-1980s at 3 research-intensive universities in close proximity, Center L served the biotechindustry. A local government agency successfully brokered its operation. It peaked at 20 researchers, 7 member firms, andabout $750K in funding. After 5 years of government funding and declining membership, it sought no further NSF funding.Likely failure factors: 1) Ample, single-investigator funding opportunities from government agencies; 2) Member firms' unwillingnessto share research and potential IP with competitors; 3) Member turnover; 4) Turnover in center leadership; 5) Widespreadopportunities to work with scientists one-on-one.Center X. A multi-university IUCRC in the early 1980s at a U.S. research-intensive university and two smaller universities nearby,Center X served the pharmaceutical industry. All 3 Universities had excellent relationships with surrounding pharmaceuticalfirms. However, Center X only operated four years before declining memberships and other factors led to its closingLikely failure factors: 1) Participating universities had limited or no doctoral programs; 2) Potential member firms were primarilymanufacturing operations with little control over R&D ; 3) University politics undermined support for the non-tenure-track director.Cases of Late FailureCenter C. Launched mid-1980s at one research-intensive University, Center C served the chemical industry. As 10-year NSFfunding ended, it had 12 members, $500K+ annual budget, 11 projects, and 9 scientists. Four years later Center C receivedanother IUCRC award for 2 University sites, then struggled with declining membership for 5 years and closed.Likely failure factors: 1) Industry members rejected a proposed University site and wider research agenda; 2) Turnover of Centerdirector, site directors, and staff; 3) Research agenda misfit with member needs; 4) Cheap, non-voting memberships; and 5)Member attrition.Center P. After 5 years a single-University IUCRC serving plastics, defense, and aerospace industries partnered with twoUniversities for a second 5-year IUCRC award in 2002. In its 10th year of NSF funding, Center P had a $1M annual budget, 26industry members, 12 projects, and 14 scientists. Unable to assemble a post-NSF organization after 2+ years, Center Pdissolved.Likely failure factors: 1) Departure of founding director and resulting leadership vacuum; 2) Cheap, non-voting memberships; 3)Turnover of member representatives and organizations; 4) Loss of administrative support at lead University; and 5) Economicpressure in member industries.Common ThemesThese cases offer learning from failure, and share 3 common themes: 1) Multiple failure factors: The IUCRCs developed problemsin 2 or more key areas: internal organization; University relations; member organization relations; and economic environment.2) Advance notice: Trouble became apparent years before failure. 3) Vicious cycles: Compounding, mutually intensifying problemsbrought accumulated, unmanageable strains.Learning Points for Triple Helix OrganizationsFor IUCRCs and other Triple Helix organizations, learning points include: 1) Importance of continuity: Failures incorporateddiscontinuities of leadership, membership, and/or staffing. 2) Need for effective University hosting: The IUCRCs lacked keyforms of University support at critical junctures. 3) Value of early intervention: Earlier action might have mitigated vicious cycles.And 4) Wider, deeper knowledge of failure factors can promote longevity in Triple Helix organizations.Madrid, October 20, 21 & 22 - 2010131