Time&Eternity

88 chapter 2
In his chapter on time and eternity, it is striking how frequently Cullmann
uses the expressions “nothing else but/than” and “only.” Such use of
language generally signifies a reductionist modus operandi. In fact, there are
passages where Cullmann reduces to such an extent that alternatives are cut
short and unnecessary dualisms arise. Thus, for example, the inevitability of
the dualism between philosophy in general (and Platonism in particular)
and the New Testament conception is not really plausible. Does the New
Testament then float in space that is void of philosophy? Does every qualitative
distinction between time and eternity lead then inevitably to Platonism?
Is the contrast of infinite time to timelessness then the only possible alternative?
No room remains in Cullmann’s system for conceptual attempts
that utilize concepts such as multi-temporality, other-temporality, and
supra-temporality. In my view, this lack of openness for options of qualitative
otherness is the most important objection to Cullmann’s presentation
of time and eternity. 202
Cullmann is quick and rigorous in reaching his conclusions. Because
time is conceived as a circle in Greek thought, being bound to time must be
experienced as a curse. 203 Since the New Testament knows only a line of
eons that runs in a consistent straight line from beginning to end, time is
like a straight line. 204 In fact, Cullmann calls it an ascending timeline, 205 although
the ascent appears to me as a smuggled-in fruit of Western notions
of progress rather than the result of an exegetical examination of the New
Testament. The combination of line, straight line, and infinity leads to a
problem left unsolved by Cullmann. The problem is intensified by the
measurability that he postulates. 206 When a straight line has a beginning
and an end, it is not infinite, but measurable. A line can be infinite if it has
neither beginning nor end, but then it can hardly be measured. Moreover,
these geometric models are incapable of expressing what actually matters to
Cullmann, namely, the salvation-historical tension between the “already”
and the “not-yet.” In retrospect, he recognized this problem correctly. 207 In
Heil als Geschichte, he also finally changed the rigid model of straight lines
to one of wavy lines, though admittedly without changing anything basic.
208
If eternity is an exclusive attribute of God, 209 but is simultaneously
nothing but (infinite) time, then the concept of eternity is already undermined
as soon as it is introduced. This results in what Friedrich Schleiermacher
calls the obscuring equating of God’s eternity with “what seems to
be eternity, namely, with infinite time,” which he combats with the words:
“We must therefore reject as inadequate all those explanations which abrogate
for God only the limits of time and not time itself, and would form
eternity from time by the removal of limits, while in fact these are oppo-