Time&Eternity

Aspects of a Theology of Time 219
served identity does not lie in the self-knowledge of human existence as an
infinite finding-of-oneself; rather, it is found in the relation, in the receiving
of oneself from an Other. 177 This must then always imply a coming-to-the-
Other and a coming-together. What Theunissen claims to be the relationship
of self and faith also applies to the eschatological self: It would be a
“communicative genesis of selfhood.” 178
In this context, I would like to question the self-evidence with which individual
self-preservation is so frequently declared as the highest good. Does
the concentration on the identity of the self in the form of an autonomous
individualism not more closely reflect a particular, Western tradition than it
does global reality? Does it not say more about the power of the Enlightenment
than about the totality of the biblical evidence? This is not to be a plea
for the opposite and an assertion of the dissolution of identity. My concern
is rather with changing the rank order: The consummation of an ego is not
the preeminent goal, but, rather, the healing of relations. This change in order
has consequences for the shaping of theology, life, and the world. An example
used by Keller may illustrate this. She talks about mothers in El Salvador
whose foremost wish is not the resurrection of their murdered
children but the realization of those qualities and opportunities of life for
which their sons and daughters had fought: healed relationships rather than
perpetuation of individual life. 179
I believe that the basic error in a position such as Mahlmann’s lies in an
inadequate theology of time. Because Mahlmann assumes—evidently without
reflecting upon it—a constant timeline, and understands eternity as
infinite time, 180 he ends up with “bad infinity,” with an endlessly extended
sequence of ages. Due to this understanding of time, the difference between
identity and continuity escapes him, at least partially. His problem is not in
fact that of preserved identity, but, rather, of preserved continuity. These
two, however, coincide only when a linear model of time is presupposed. In
a relational model of time, the question of continuity recedes, giving way to
the question of identity constituted by relation, which, in turn, is coupled
with the question of what a person actually is. 181
The “Already” and the “Not-Yet”: Eschatological
Disruption of Linear Chronology
In chapter 2 (see pp. 64–81), it became clear that the tension between the
“already” and the “not-yet” is constitutive for the New Testament understanding
of time. The reign of God has already dawned, but it has not yet
been realized. According to Paul, a person who has been baptized has already
been dead and buried with Christ, so that he or she can live a new life;
however, according to 1 John, what we will be has not yet been revealed. 182