Time&Eternity

310 notes to chapter 4
169. 1 John 3:2.
170. See pp. 115–16 above.
171. Cf., e.g., Mahlmann, “Auferstehung der Toten und ewiges Leben.”
172. Mahlmann, “Auferstehung der Toten und ewiges Leben,” 118.
173. See pp. 115–16 above and Jüngel, “Der Tod als Geheimnis des Lebens,” 340.
174. “.l.l. einer unabhängig vom Wissen anderer, einer selbstgewußten Existenz des
Menschen über seinen Tod hinaus,” Mahlmann, “Auferstehung der Toten und ewiges
Leben,” 120.
175. See pp. 191–93 above and Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, 140ff., etc.
176. Thus, e.g., Ringleben, “Gott und das ewige Leben,” 56f. Jüngel also speaks of
eternal life as a transformation by means of which the self forever becomes identical to its
life (Tod, 154; the relevant sentence is missing in the English translation, 122).
177. Cf. also the presupposition of an identity constituted by relation in Ps. 104:29.
178. Theunissen, Negative Theologie der Zeit, 360: “Das Werden der Freiheit zu sich aus
der Freiheit von sich geschieht im Grunde des Glaubens selbst als kommunikative Genese
des Selbstseins” (The becoming of freedom to itself from the freedom from itself occurs in
the ground of faith itself as the communicative genesis of selfhood).
179. Keller, “The Last Laugh,” 389f.
180. Mahlmann, “Auferstehung der Toten und ewiges Leben,” 129ff.
181. Many of the eschatological themes addressed here call for a discussion on what a
person is or on what necessarily belongs to being a person. A discussion of these questions
would go beyond the framework of this study, however. Here, this much should be noted:
I understand personhood to be constituted by relationality. Accordingly, one of the most
important traits of a person is the ability to integrate what he or she can also differentiate
and keep separate: public and private, spirit and body, rationality and emotionality, faith
and knowledge, etc.
182. Rom. 6:3–11 and 1 John 3:2.
183. Ratschow, “Eschatologie,” 350f., 357f., 359, 361.
184. Ratschow, Anmerkungen, and see pp. 62–64 above. Ott also works with the idea
of the unveiling of the hidden present (Eschatologie, 18, 41ff., 69f., etc.). The eschatological
event is the apocalypse of that which previously was already established. Then, however,
the continuous existence of the cosmos and of humanity means a disruption of the eschaton
(15); and the meaning of this interim becomes, as Ott fittingly asserts, one of the most
difficult problems of eschatology (26). In his work, Ott wishes to overcome an absolute,
linear understanding of time (56f., 66f.), but he does not find an appropriate alternative.
Instead, he dodges the issue by moving to the area of individual ethics and a qualitative description
of eternity: Eternal life is the glorificatio of God (38), the absolute assurance of
God (45), and nothing other than the revelation of our present life (41).
185. Cf. in this context also the provocative account of the role of apocalyptic thought,
which has changed during the course of the ages, in the horizon of politics and the church,
in Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then; on the subject of time, esp. 84–138.
186. Ratschow, “Eschatologie,” 361.
187. In her article, “The Last Laugh,” Keller similarly describes the strengths of Moltmann’s
book.
188. Pannenberg attempts this in Systematische Theologie, vol. 2, 123; trans., 101; cf. pp.
106–9 above.
189. Moltmann, Das Kommen Gottes, 291; trans., 264.
190. Ibid., 314; trans., 285.
191. “Reversible Zeit ist eine Art zeitlose Zeit, denn diese Zeitform ist selbst zeitlos wie
die absolute Zeit Newtons.” Ibid.