Time&Eternity

280 notes to chapter 2
413. “.l.l. als ein[en] neue[n] Anfang aus dem vernichtenden Nichts des Todes,” Jüngel,
“Der Tod als Geheimnis” (1980), 347.
414. “Die Lebenszeit eines Menschen .l.l. wird nur dann eigentliche Geschichte, wenn
sie verstanden wird als Moment der Geschichte Gottes mit allen Menschen.” Jüngel, Tod,
149; trans., 118.
415. Lévinas, Time and the Other. For an introduction into the thinking of Lévinas, especially
in relation to Husserl, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Rosenzweig, see Kemp, Lévinas.
416. Lévinas, Time and the Other, 32.
417. In my opinion, “absolute other” should rather be understood here in the sense of
“radical other.” Cf. in this respect also Ricoeur’s criticism of Lévinas in Ricoeur, Soi-même
comme un autre, 387–93. Whereas Lévinas stresses the incomprehensibility of the “other,”
Ricoeur emphasizes the meaning, and consequences, of the communication between “me”
and “the other”: “Bref, ne faut-il pas qu’une dialogique superpose la relation à la distance
prétendument ab-solue entre le moi séparé et l’Autre enseignant?” (391).
418. Lévinas, Time and the Other, 32.
419. Ibid., 79.
420. Ibid., 39.
421. Ibid., 57.
422. Ibid., 54, 42, etc.
423. Ibid., 86.
424. Ibid., 81, etc.
425. Ibid., 70ff. (the moment we are no longer able to be able; ibid., 74).
426. Lévinas, God, Death, and Time. In comparison to the earlier writing entitled
Time and the Other, the discussion here is no longer about the absoluteness of the “other.”
427. Levinas, God, Death, and Time, 106–12.
428. Ibid., 107.
429. Ibid., 110.
430. Ibid.
431. Ibid., 111.
432. Ibid., 112.
433. Ibid., 116.
434. Lévinas, Time and the Other, 77, 79.
435. In Lévinas, the transcendent alterity that is opening up time is tied only to the
human. He takes his starting point from an otherness based on content, which he calls
femininity. Subsequently, he speaks of fatherhood as a category in which freedom arises
and time is fulfilled (Time and the Other, 84–94). The concepts of femininity, fatherhood,
and sonship seem to be problematic, however, since they are easily misunderstood. Their
usage obscures, e.g., the criticism of power intended by Lévinas, ibid., 37.
Chapter 3
1. Daly, Creation and Redemption, 20.
2. “Wenn anders die Theologie bei ihrem Thema verharren will, hat sie sich nicht mit
den verschiedenen philosophischen, naturwissenschaftlichen und geschichtswissenschaftlichen
Begriffen von Zeit und Ewigkeit zu befassen .l.l. ,” Schneider, “Die Bedeutung
der Begriffe,” 284. Schneider likewise shares Cullmann’s concept of eternity being an
eternally long time (ibid). His limited treatment of the question of time and eternity then
also leads to such obviously problematic conclusions as: “Der Tag der Erschaffung des
Menschen in der Vergangenheit und der Tag der Wiederkunft Christi in der Zukunft