Time&Eternity

Biblical and Theological Conceptions of Time 93
The Eschatological Difference between Time and Eternity
The eschatological difference between time and eternity needs to be understood
in light of the tension between that which was and is, and that
which is yet to come. It manifests itself in the difference between old and
new time. It does not work with an extrapolation of the existing as the idea
of progress does. Instead, the eschatological difference between time and
eternity focuses on the new that breaks into the existing. In contrast to the
quantitative difference, the eschatological distinction does not presuppose
infinite continuity; it builds on daunting discontinuity instead. In contrast
to the ontological difference, time is not measured in relation to its opposite
(eternity) in order to ascertain what and how much it lacks with regard to
complete being. Rather, eternity itself initially moves into the background,
giving way to the question of what makes time old or new. Because this
question cannot be answered without considering the Jesus event, this differentiation
model is essentially linked to Christology, which was not at all
true of the ontological model, and was only partially true of the quantitative
model.
Apart from Dalferth’s scheme, which has already been introduced, it
seems that examples for consistent eschatological differentiations between
time and eternity are more difficult to find than examples for the other two
models. Nevertheless, one can recognize tendencies toward an eschatological
differentiation in Karl Rahner’s reflections on a theology of time. Rahner
complains of the apparent lack of a theology of time. 248 He is also intentional
about linking his thoughts on a theology of time to a scientific
pluralism, 249 which makes his ideas particularly interesting within the context
of this study.
The key concept in Rahner’s remarks on the concept of time is the history
of freedom. 250 Time is the condition for the possibility of a history of
freedom. The concern is not a freedom from something, but rather—in eschatological
terms—a freedom oriented toward fulfillment in God. In the
framework defined in this way, time must be recognized as the determination
of the world, which, however, should not be confused with the statement
that the world is in time. 251 Transitoriness as experienced temporality
is the condition of freedom. This becomes especially clear in relation to
death, for there is a yearning for the end as consummation. Accordingly,
manifested in death is “that towards which the will of the free person tends
at its deepest and most ultimate, because this free person must seek the end
of that which merely prolongs itself in time in order to achieve his consummation.”
252 Rahner considers the fear of death consistently as a phenomenon
of the surface of human consciousness only, whereas at the foundation