Time&Eternity

198 chapter 4
stract than in Newton. The question of what kind of God they more or less
explicitly identify with a world formula remains basically unanswered. This
lack of sophistication vis-à-vis theological complexity is perplexing. A certain
amount of specialized scientific knowledge is expected of theologians
who deal with science, and rightly so. However, this demand evidently does
not apply in reverse—as these two examples show—yet it should. A dialogue
that is to succeed will have to consciously take into consideration the
entire scope of competence of all dialogue partners.
Trinitarian thought can make an important contribution to both interdisciplinary
discussions and a theology of time, but its potential alone does
not suffice for constructing a theology of time. Rather, even after considering
the findings from chapter 3, our impression from chapter 2 remains,
namely, that eschatology is the theological place where the most can be said
about a relational theology of time. Eschatology allows reflection upon time
as multi-temporality or a complexity of times—indeed, it even demands
such reflection.
Eschatology as the Key to a Relational
Understanding of Time
If, at the end of the previous section, there was reason to complain
about arbitrary speculation, then here arises the question of whether the
area of eschatology does not provide an even more slippery slope. Can eschatology
be more than speculation? It could hardly be more than this if it
were concerned only with providing calculations of future events. However,
eschatology is instead concerned with the question: “What may we hope?”
It is certainly not thereby automatically relieved of the suspicion of mere
speculation, and it continues to be fraught with difficulties; but this question
makes clear that eschatology cannot be circumvented if one wishes to
gain a good understanding of existence, time, and the cosmos.
Ferment or Finale—The Role of Eschatology in Theology
In the words of Catherine Keller, eschatology is a “clumsy nineteenth
century term.” 64 If this is true, then can it really be meaningful to make it
the key concept for a relational understanding of time? A few comments on
the concept of eschatology, though in no way exhaustive, thus appear necessary
before we can proceed. 65
As Sigurd Hjelde 66 has shown, there has never been a clear definition of
eschatology. A certain ambiguity has accompanied it from its beginnings
and “must .l.l. be recognized as the historically and principally given frame-