Time&Eternity

Biblical and Theological Conceptions of Time 91
into the past, for a lasting present would be eternity. For this reason, it belongs
to the essence of time that it “flows toward non-existence” [tendit non
esse]. 229 This tendency toward nonexistence is evident when time appears as
memory of an earlier present and as the expectation of a future at hand in
the actual present. The present is at the heart of Augustine’s doctrine of
time, 230 yet, even the present is constantly threatened by nonexistence. Given
this characteristic, it is understandable why Augustine initially translates
the question of the essence of time into the question of its place and its
measurability.
Strictly speaking, the separate existence of time as past, present, and future
cannot be expressed. Instead, one should say: “there are three times, a
present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to
come.” 231 As memoria (memory), contuitus (observation, attention), and expectatio
(expectation), these three are in the soul. 232 Thus, Augustine finally
concludes that time is a kind of extension, 233 namely, an extension of the
mind itself [distentio animi]. 234 Along with creation, time was created by
God, the operator omnium temporum (operator of all times). 235 Time is not
the movement of a body. 236
Measured against eternity, the distentio animi takes on the negative taste
of a shortcoming or a defect. The distentio is then no longer simply the solution
to the problem of the measurability of time in the sense of extension;
it is also, simultaneously, a synonym for fragmentation and being scattered.
Temporality appears as the malady of scatteredness, and eternity, as the perfection
of calmness. Only secundum intentionem, “in the manner of tense
composure,” 237 does a consoling hope for a less fragmented life open up.
From this perspective, intentio is then no longer only the anticipation of an
entire hymn before it is sung 238 and the power that moves what is still in the
future into the past; 239 rather, it is hope in the “Last Things.” 240 Thus, intentio
and distentio fall into a dialectic of praise and lament that can be resolved
only through mystical language: “The storms of incoherent events tear to
pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, until that day when,
purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow together to merge into
you. 241
This view of Augustine’s hardly leaves room for an optimistic notion of
progress. Augustine does not expect something from a future within time,
but rather from a present. Only in the praesens attentio of the soul can a person,
by means of a combination of memory (memoria), present attention
(contuitus, attentio), and expectation (expectatio), establish a unity of temporal
events. 242 And only in moments of fulfilled present, when time opens itself
to eternity, so to speak, in a rara visio (a rare vision) of enlightenment, 243
is it possible for human beings to access, though fragmentarily, the tran-