Time&Eternity

58 chapter 1
only reality. This fixation can result in time’s being forced to accomplish
more than it actually can. It simply has to provide everything. If it is unable
to do so, however, one quickly feels that there is never enough time. Thus,
there appears to be a correlation between the experience of a lack of time,
on the one hand, and the observed diminishing of eternity’s importance, to
the benefit of time, on the other hand. The contemporary who is plagued
by the fear of missing out on far too much in his or her short lifespan is interested
in living as quickly as possible and knowing that the future—in our
case, including eternity—has been exhausted as much as possible, so that as
little as possible will be left undone. Marianne Gronemeyer calls this radical
contemporization a maltreatment of time. 369 What Gronemeyer says about
the relationship of the future to the present harmonizes well with what is
expressed in numerous modern hymns about the relation between eternity
and time: “Homo accelerandus had a serious argument with the future, at
least with that future which rightly bears its name because it contains that
which, unmade and unplanned, ‘comes toward’ us. He issued a draft notice
to the unpredictable and unforeseeable Not-Yet: The future must appear in
the present.” 370
Eternity must appear in time and give an account of itself. The loss of
meaning for eternity leads to an increased significance for the individual life
in the here and now, whose youth, in any case, must be preserved as long as
possible. If the notion of an eternity beyond time has become irrelevant,
then the realization of the dream of eternal life in the here and now must be
sought. Thus, middle age as the apex of the accelerated and self-realizing life
becomes more important than life’s end; one’s fortieth or fiftieth birthday is
more important than one’s seventieth or eightieth. A highly relevant eternity,
however, can go hand in hand with respect for old age, with careful
preparation for death, and with a general relativization of the temporal. A
reference to the meaning of the death penalty in the early medieval sub
specie aeternitatis can emphasize this. 371
In a time that does not relate to eternity, speed can quickly become a
value in itself. Acceleration is good; a delay—or even a standstill—is bad.
Fast speed and quick solutions are preferable, while farsightedness approaches
boredom. In this setting, boredom can no longer be experienced
as a potential for creativity, but rather only as sheer misfortune. Change and
instant gratification, on the other hand, signify happiness and good fortune.
The problem is that the constant speed record ultimately leads to precisely
that which was to be avoided from the very beginning—boredom and discontent.
Rhythms and differences fall victim to the constant push for faster
speeds. Resistance is largely eliminated so that, in the final analysis, a standardization
and leveling occurs. This, in turn, creates a feeling of emptiness.