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Sivakumar and Raj (1997), inter-brand movements can be derived analytically as we demonstrated earlier<br />

in the theory development. However, analytical derivations are based on infinitesimal calculus. While<br />

useful to theorize, in order to get an idea of actual movements and also to see whether it works with real<br />

numbers, we need to construct realistic scenarios. Therefore, share changes are computed by<br />

incorporating various <strong>value</strong>s in the utility functions and making suitable assumptions to ensure that the<br />

market share and other key market characteristics are kept close to reality as possible. These computations<br />

presented in Table 2 demonstrates that between any pair of high-low tier brands (i.e., H1 and L, H2 and L,<br />

and H3 and L), the results derived earlier holds good. Note that the asymmetry holds good for all<br />

combinations irrespective of their market share. Also, to avoid overcrowding of the table, some of the<br />

intermediate calculations discussed below are not given in the table but the final results are.<br />

Evidence for Asymmetric <strong>Quality</strong> Tier Competition. Result 1 derived from the conceptual framework<br />

implies that the competition between a high quality brand and a low quality brand is asymmetric,<br />

consistent with the predominant research findings in marketing. For example, Table 2 indicates a<br />

movement of 6.26 market share points from L to H1 when H1 reduces its price by 20 cents and a<br />

movement of 3.78 market share points from H1 to L when L reduces its price by 20 cents. Clearly<br />

asymmetry favors H1 and the asymmetric advantage amounts to 2.48 market share points. The asymmetric<br />

advantage of H2 over L is 0.53 and that of H3 over L is 0.70.<br />

Role of Price Differential. Ceteris paribus (i.e., for a given quality differential), increasing the price<br />

differential was hypothesized to result in smaller asymmetric advantage for high quality brands (H2).<br />

Table 2 illustrates the asymmetry for the base scenario and the scenario in which the price differential is<br />

increased 10 cents. The larger price differential results in an asymmetry (favoring H1 over L) of 1.58<br />

market share point versus asymmetry of 2.48 market share points in the base case (a difference of 0.9),<br />

confirming result 2. Similar results hold for competition between H2 and L and that between H3 and L.<br />

Role of <strong>Quality</strong> Differential. Ceteris paribus (i.e., for a given price differential), increasing the quality<br />

differential was hypothesized to result in greater asymmetric advantage for high quality brands (Result 3).<br />

Table 2 illustrates the asymmetry for the base scenario and the scenario in which the quality differential is<br />

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