Germar Rudolf, Resistance Is Obligatory (2012; PDF-Datei

GERMAR RUDOLF, RESISTANCE IS OBLIGATORY
V. Violence
About the dicey topic of using violence Popper pointed out: 253
“There is only one further use of violence in political quarrels
which I should consider justified. I mean the resistance, once democracy
has been attained, to any attack (whether from within or
without the state) against the democratic constitution and the use of
democratic methods. Any such attack, especially if it comes from the
government in power, or if it is tolerated by it, should be resisted by
all loyal citizens, even to the use of violence.”
In this point I no longer agree with Karl Popper, because even if resistance
is justified, I am still strictly against violence, and this for the
following reasons:
1. On principle: violent resistance leads to even more counter-violence
by the state and is therefore counterproductive.
2. On morals: One cannot convincingly fight the misuse of governmental
power, which itself is violence, with counter-violence.
3. In most cases violence strikes innocent bystanders, as was visible in
the case of the peace and ecological movement. Victims of acts of
trespassing and coercion were at best some subordinate government
employees or even noninvolved third persons, and the largest group
of victims of this violence doubtlessly were policemen as the whipping
boys of the nation.
4. The use of violence leads to the rejection of those using violence and
thus also of their concerns by the populations, hence the exact opposite
of what one tries to achieve.
5. When using violence, it is impossible to maintain the principle of
proportionality, because what kind of act of violence would, for example,
be justified to punish a judge in a lynch justice manner for
sending a dissident to prison for several months or years?
6. In a state under the rule of law, the state’s monopoly of the use of
force is too important a principle to be undermined, because in such
a case chaos and anarchy loom as the last consequences.
7. As already mentioned, it is debatable anyway, whether judges and
state attorneys imprisoning dissidents are criminally liable, because
on the one hand they are under a kind of duress, for they would expose
themselves to prosecution for violating the law in case of an
253 Ibid., p. 151f.
204