Germar Rudolf, Resistance Is Obligatory (2012; PDF-Datei

GERMAR RUDOLF, RESISTANCE IS OBLIGATORY
How does one determine that someone is aiming merely to confirm
preconceived notions?
All these questions aim at intention and motivation, i.e. at features of
the author, but not of the work, and are therefore entirely IRRELE-
VANT!
Consciously or subconsciously we all have certain preconceived
opinions, expectations, judgments etc., as I have pointed out. Whether
someone is seeking the truth as his exclusive, his primary or at least as a
serious goal can almost never be determined with certainty from the
outside, and sometimes not even from the inside. These personal questions
about a scientist or an author are therefore not decisive for determining
the question of the scientific nature of a work.
I also consider as erroneous the formulation of the Constitutional
High Court that everything which is serious “in form and content” is to
be considered as science, because the content as such is precisely not a
criterion to determine the scientific nature of a work. At the beginning
of this quotation the Court still maintains that these content-related factors
(correctness, soundness, and completeness) play no role. But now
they do it after all? Science is a question of form. Its contents are changing
constantly: (panta rei = everything is in flux).
Regarding the question of the scientific nature of a work the Court
would have done better to introduce more indicators of the work at issue
that deal with questions of form, rather than adducing misguided
and impermissible criteria about the content and the person, which open
the floodgates of arbitrariness. It therefore needs to be pointed out that
the Constitutional High Court is obviously not competent to determine
what science actually is.
Should the German Federal Constitutional High Court ever make
similarly superficial and untenable, even embarrassingly incompetent
statements in my case, then allow me to announce already now that it
will be my moral duty as a scientist to reject such a verdict, whatever it
might be. Or expressed in the style of Copernicus: 57
“If perchance there should be foolish speakers who, together
with those ignorant of all history and epistemology, will take it upon
themselves to decide concerning these things, and should dare to assail
this my work, they are of no importance to me, to such an extent
do I despise their judgment as rash.”
But allow me to add right away that it does not surprise me to read
such an inadequate verdict by the Constitutional High Court, because
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