Germar Rudolf, Resistance Is Obligatory (2012; PDF-Datei

GERMAR RUDOLF, RESISTANCE IS OBLIGATORY
“First a supreme rule is laid down which serves as a kind of
norm for deciding upon the remaining rules, and which is thus a rule
of a higher type. It is the rule which says that the other rules of scientific
procedure must be designed in such a way that they do not
protect any statement in science against ‘falsification’ [= empirical
refutation, GR].”
Thus, proscribing attempts to disprove a thesis – including in our
case the prohibition of revisionist attempts to refute established theses
on the “Holocaust” – is an assault on the most basic principles of science.
But which thesis among the many being discussed should be preferred?
On this subject Popper says the following: 83
“We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition
with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself
the fittest to survive. This will be the one which not only has hitherto
stood up to the severest tests, but the one which is also testable in
the most rigorous way.”
“The old scientific ideal of epistm – of absolutely certain, demonstrable
knowledge – has proved to be an idol. The demand for
scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement
[thesis, GR] must remain tentative forever. It may indeed be
corroborated, but every corroboration is relative […].
The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be
right; for it is not his possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth,
that makes the man of scientist, but his persistent and reckless critical
quest for truth.”
“Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the
hazard of refutation do not take part in the scientific game.”
Allow me to read this sentence again very carefully, Mr. District Attorney:
“Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the
hazard of refutation do not take part in the scientific game.”
What a powerful assertion that is!
The ancient Latin scientific maxim “De omnibus dubitandum est”
(everything must be doubted) coincides exactly with this line of argumentation.
And now I may again quote Kogon and his colleagues:
83 Ibid., pp. 108, 280, 280.
67