Germar Rudolf, Resistance Is Obligatory (2012; PDF-Datei

GERMAR RUDOLF, RESISTANCE IS OBLIGATORY
entific standards – as was already laid out in the ruling of 12 Feb.
2007 under no. 2, 1st paragraph.
6. The motion filed on 12 Feb. 2007 by the defense lawyer Stolz to
read the expert statements of the expert witness Prof. Dr. Jagschitz
and his interrogation as an expert witness (annex 19) is rejected, because
the requested gathering of evidence is irrelevant for the decision,
because even if the probative allegations would be confirmed,
the Chamber would not question the self-evidence of the Holocaust
in the sense of no. 3 of the chamber’s ruling of 12 Feb. 2007.
7. The motion filed on 12 Feb. 2007 by the defense lawyer Stolz to
interrogate Prof. Dr. Nolte (annex 21) is rejected regarding no. 1 to
4, because the Chamber has its own expertise concerning the assessment
of scientific standards – as was already laid out in the ruling
of 12 Feb. 2007 under no. 2, 1st paragraph.
Comments
The motion to summon Prof. Dr. Ernst Topitsch had to be withdrawn,
because the witness had died on 26 January 2003.
Point 2 of this ruling of rejection proves that the “self-evidence of
the Holocaust,” which the federal German judiciary gives as a reason to
reject or even prosecute motions to introduce evidence designed to undermine
the self-evidence of the Holocaust, exists entirely independently
of what established, even worldwide recognized experts on the history
of the Third Reich consider to be accurate. Four established historians,
three of them retired professors, express doubts, but that does not
touch the court. Even if all the historians of the world expressed doubts,
the court would probably still not be moved. This proves that the formula
of self-evidence has developed an unconstitutional independent existence
which can no longer be challenged with legal methods.
When rejecting the motions to hear the witnesses Prof. Schlee and
Prof. Hilberg, the Chamber committed a revealing blunder: requested
had been regarding Prof. Schlee in addition and regarding Prof. Hilberg
exclusively that they ought to determine whether the incriminated
works serve research and science. This is not identical to the question
whether the works itself are scientific in nature. Whether the works in
question serve the historical sciences, however, cannot possibly be decided
by a judge who is not an expert in this field. This requires the expertise
of a specialist historian. This sweeping rejection by the court
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