Germar Rudolf, Resistance Is Obligatory (2012; PDF-Datei

GERMAR RUDOLF, RESISTANCE IS OBLIGATORY
It is known, though, that Schliemann did indeed find a “treasure of
gold,” but that he was incorrect in bringing it in direct connection to
Homer’s Iliad as the “treasure of Priam.” His results were included in
the second step of science, which may be called that of “critiquing.” As
much as Schliemann was a trailblazer, he was not alone in the scientific
world, but had expert colleagues, co-researchers who were able to introduce
other aspects and to point out other facts. On this {p. 9} level
science is a back and forth criticism between experts, and in these dialogues
“directions” and “schools” develop. Already Schliemann was led
by an “image,” an imagination, an interpretation, or else his eliciting
would have resembled the haphazard collecting of any treasure hunter
who has nothing else in mind than sales to tourists. Even scientific
schools of thoughts are exposed to the danger of temptation by such
images and assumptions: the historian of ideologies primarily pays attention
to ideologies, for the social historian societal relations are of
prime importance, for the political historian mainly the decisions of
those in power are conspicuous. The formation of schools of thought
frequently even exacerbates the one-sidedness of perception, but another
school confronts this bias, and the next generation of scientists may
arrive at a synthesis from that school’s biases.
However, a certain amount of self-criticism and willingness for revision
should exist in each direction. Wherever this is completely lacking,
a direction calling itself scientific may justly be described as a kind of
unscientific dogmatism, and the following would serve as a hallmark:
an excess of polemics, proffering unproven claims, restriction to quotes
from one’s own school of thought, and as an extreme case a fanaticism
willing to destroy an enemy rather than respond to an adversary. But
even science has its own extremes: with regard to popular concepts or
contents of belief, science is not rarely {p. 10} iconoclastic, as is
demonstrated by the grand example of “Bible criticism,” and frequently
even that is perceived as an extreme provocation which should be
common to all science: distance to the immediate issue, which appears
to be callousness in no rare cases. Hence distrust is appropriate, where
science is all too prepared to serve matters of the “heart,” as has been
the case during the discussion about the war guilt after World War I.
But an abrupt separation is inadmissible here as well: With regard to
such sensitive topics, an entire array of possible interpretations regularly
evolves, and even the poles of exclusive blames of culpability can be
useful as ideal types. He who claims the sole guilt of Russia could, for
267