Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library
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Health care 107<br />
Managed competition<br />
US<br />
In 1992, Bill Clinton campaigned <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> presidency of <strong>the</strong> United <strong>State</strong>s on a plat<strong>for</strong>m<br />
that included as a key plank an ambitious reorganization of <strong>the</strong> health care delivery<br />
system. His vision was <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> country to adopt a system that ensured universal access to<br />
a comprehensive range of health care services in a manner roughly analogous to <strong>the</strong><br />
managed competition model being implemented in Germany and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands. 59<br />
Although Clinton’s Health Security Act appeared to address <strong>the</strong> significant problems that<br />
had prompted <strong>the</strong> need <strong>for</strong> national health re<strong>for</strong>m—concerns of <strong>the</strong> uninsured 60 and cost<br />
containment—<strong>the</strong> plan never<strong>the</strong>less failed. While partisan politics, <strong>the</strong> strength of <strong>the</strong><br />
health care lobbies, <strong>the</strong> inexperience of <strong>the</strong> Clinton administration, and <strong>the</strong> complexity of<br />
<strong>the</strong> plan all played a role in <strong>the</strong> its demise, Sherry Glied has asserted that <strong>the</strong>se factors<br />
alone cannot account <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>t. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, she argues that <strong>the</strong> real basis <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> plan’s failure stemmed from three distinct sources. 61 First were <strong>the</strong> irreconcilable<br />
differences between <strong>the</strong> two main groups of re<strong>for</strong>mers, supporters of single-payer re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
and supporters of market-oriented, managed competition. While <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer believe that<br />
health care has a unique quality that distinguishes it from o<strong>the</strong>r goods and services and<br />
thus cannot be allocated by way of <strong>the</strong> market, <strong>the</strong> latter view health care as a good like<br />
any o<strong>the</strong>r and favour delivery by way of <strong>the</strong> market. In <strong>the</strong> end, although <strong>the</strong> two groups<br />
were brought toge<strong>the</strong>r to attempt to find a compromise between <strong>the</strong> two ideals, nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
was willing to yield to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Second were <strong>the</strong> false assumptions about health care<br />
spending and <strong>the</strong> health sector made by <strong>the</strong>se two groups. <strong>The</strong> supporters of single-payer<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m failed to recognize that a centrally organized health care system would be too<br />
inflexible and would respond too slowly to inevitable and desirable changes in health<br />
care technology and patient preferences. Supporters of market-oriented, managed<br />
competition, however, were unable to acknowledge that <strong>the</strong> market solution has difficulty<br />
addressing <strong>the</strong> distributional concern, namely that it cannot guarantee adequate universal<br />
coverage and health security. Finally, nei<strong>the</strong>r group was able to address successfully <strong>the</strong><br />
financing of health care re<strong>for</strong>m. Although Clinton’s proposed re<strong>for</strong>ms were never<br />
implemented, certain features may have been viable and are thus worth examining <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
purposes of a comparative analysis.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Clinton model of managed competition would have been superimposed upon a<br />
predominantly private health care services and insurance system (although it should be<br />
noted that over 40 percent of <strong>the</strong> US health care system is publicly funded). Mandatory<br />
coverage would be provided to employees and <strong>the</strong>ir dependents primarily through<br />
employer mandates (with employers meeting 80 percent of costs and employees 20<br />
percent) and public subsidies <strong>for</strong> low-wage firms and low-income individuals to assist in<br />
<strong>the</strong> purchase of health insurance. Employer-provided health insurance would continue to<br />
be non-taxable as an employment benefit and deductible as a business expense by<br />
employers. Clinton’s plan required government-appointed sponsors (referred to in <strong>the</strong><br />
initial proposal as “Health Insurance Purchasing Co-operatives” and in subsequent<br />
amendments as “Regional Alliances”) to act as intermediaries between consumers and<br />
insurers. 62 Funding from government, employers and consumers would be funnelled<br />
through <strong>the</strong> Alliances, which would consolidate <strong>the</strong> purchasing power of individual