Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library

Notes 226
9 Barr, Nicholas, The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998), pp. 347–8; see also Barr, p. 96 (reproduced in Table 2.1, this volume).
10 Bradford and Shaviro, p. 45.
11 Bridge, Gary, “Citizen choice in public services: voucher systems,” in Emanuel Savas (ed.)
Alternatives for Delivering Public Services (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. 54.
12 Osbourne, D. and Gaebler, T., Reinventing Government (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1992),
p. xxi.
13 Ibid.
14 Andrei Shleifer, “State versus private ownership,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
12(4) (Autumn, 1998), p. 148.
15 See Le Grand and Estrin, especially “An equitarian market socialism,” by Peter Abell, pp.
78–99.
16 Martha Minow, “Public and private partnerships: accounting for the new religion,” Harvard
Law Review, 116 (March, 2003).
17 Ronald A.Cass, “Privatization: politics, law, and theory,” Marquette Law Review, 71(449)
(1988), p. 488.
18 See, for instance, Alan Walker “The political economy of privatisation,” in J.Le Grand and
R.Robinson (eds) Privatisation and the Welfare State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp.
19–44; and, more recently, Martha Minow, “Public and private partnerships: accounting for
the new religion,” Harvard Law Review, 116 (2003), p. 1229. For a response to Prof.
Minow’s article, see also M.Trebilcock and E.Iacobucci, “Privatization and accountability,”
Harvard Law Review, 116(5) (2003), pp. 1422–53.
19 Hart et al., supra note 1.
20 See Michael J.Trebilcock, The Prospects of Reinventing Government (Toronto: CD Howe
Institute, 1994), pp. 7–8; Michael Jensen and William Meckling, “Theory of the firm:
managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 3 (1976), p. 305; and Michael Jensen and Clifford Smith, “Stockholder,
manager, and creditor interests: applications of agency theory,” in Edward Altman and
Martin Subrahmanyan (eds) Recent Advances in Corporate Finance (Homewood, IL:
Richard D.Irwin, 1985), p. 38.
21 Friedman, pp. 1–36.
22 Trebilcock, p. 8; Jensen and Smith, “Stockholder,” p. 38.
23 Trebilcock, p. 8.
24 Trebilcock, pp. 9–10.
25 Minow, p. 1270; see also Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Public
Good (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002), especially pp. 150–6.
26 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, p. 1449.
27 Jody Freeman, “Extending public law norms through privatization,” Harvard Law Review,
116(5) (March, 2003), p. 1285.
28 Situations where funds are allocated by a different jurisdiction than the one which actually
contracts for services can create further contractual complications. In Canada, for instance, a
large portion of health care funding takes the form of transfer payments from the federal
government to the provincial health ministries, and conflicts often arise over how much
control the federal authorities should be able to exercise over the funding decisions of
individual provinces. In this case, concerns about federalism and regional sovereignty create
another array of principal-agent problems..
29 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, p. 1426.
30 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, pp. 1427–8.
31 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, p. 1427; Trebilcock, p. 11.
32 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Economics of the Public Sector, 3rd edn (New York: Norton, 2000), p.
80; for a more general discussion of market failure due to incomplete markets, see pp. 76–