Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library
Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library
Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library
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Labour market training 195<br />
inefficient. Put ano<strong>the</strong>r way, centrally devised allocation methods are likely to result in<br />
systemic and pervasive misallocation of resources. Decentralized, market-based decision<br />
making about job-training on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, as is common in <strong>the</strong> United <strong>State</strong>s, is likely<br />
to result in fewer systemic errors of this nature.<br />
In Europe, and particularly Sweden, classroom training is more often coupled with on<strong>the</strong>-job<br />
training than in North America. 51 Sweden’s classroom training programs have<br />
often been cited as examples of effective labour market training, although it has been<br />
found that those individuals who acquire practical, on-<strong>the</strong>-job training in <strong>the</strong> Swedish<br />
program are more successful than those who receive only classroom instruction. Both<br />
programs, however, have only modestly positive effects on labour market attractiveness<br />
<strong>for</strong> participants.<br />
On-<strong>the</strong>-job training<br />
Subsidized employment, or on-<strong>the</strong>-job training, is already part of <strong>the</strong> government jobtraining<br />
strategy in both Canada and <strong>the</strong> United <strong>State</strong>s and some studies argue that it is<br />
superior to classroom training. <strong>The</strong> OECD argues that <strong>the</strong> Canadian Employability<br />
Improvement Programme (CEIP) “appears to derive much of its success from welltargeted<br />
measures, both to <strong>the</strong> individual and to local labour market needs.” 52 Policy<br />
recommendations include keeping “programmes small in scale and well-targeted so that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y can cater to a relatively homogeneous group of <strong>the</strong> unemployed.” 53 Evidence from<br />
<strong>the</strong> US Employment Service suggests that <strong>the</strong> individual-treatment approach shortened<br />
unemployment duration and yielded benefits that greatly exceeded <strong>the</strong> higher costs of<br />
targeted programs. 54 Martin finds that programs receiving positive evaluations are<br />
typically those that have <strong>the</strong> following three characteristics: tight targeting; small-scale<br />
delivery; and strong on-<strong>the</strong>-job components. 55 Finally, <strong>the</strong> US National JTPA (Job<br />
Training Partnership Act) study, conducted by Abt Associates, provides fur<strong>the</strong>r support<br />
<strong>for</strong> increasing use of on-<strong>the</strong>-job programs. <strong>The</strong> study found that, “adults recommended<br />
<strong>for</strong> classroom training in occupational skills experienced no significant gains in earnings,<br />
but adults recommended <strong>for</strong> on-<strong>the</strong>-job training achieved significant gains.” 56<br />
However, certain problems are evident in <strong>the</strong>se programs. First, most programs have<br />
been structured without <strong>the</strong> possibility of flexible adjustments to reflect changing labour<br />
market demands. Thus, programs have been instituted to instruct individuals in certain<br />
skills even when <strong>the</strong>re may be little demand <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Leaving <strong>the</strong> choice of skills<br />
acquired up to <strong>the</strong> individual worker would be a more efficient method of allocation.<br />
Second, <strong>the</strong>re are strong incentives <strong>for</strong> firms to spend very little on training or simply do<br />
away with training altoge<strong>the</strong>r. Firms also have an incentive to exploit <strong>the</strong> opportunity to<br />
hire unskilled workers (whom <strong>the</strong>y may have hired and trained in any event) and train<br />
<strong>the</strong>m with government funding at little or no extra cost to <strong>the</strong>mselves. Consequently,<br />
wage subsidy programs have often been plagued by high deadweight, substitution and<br />
displacement losses. In addition, public employment programs have tended to result in<br />
temporary “make-work” stints with marginal effects on <strong>the</strong> future employability of<br />
participants. 57