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Notes 228
on the supplier’s claims about them; search goods are those whose attributes are fully
observable on prior inspection: see Phillip Nelson, “Advertising and information,” Journal
of Political Economy, 82 (1974), p. 729; Nelson, “Information and consumer bahavior,”
Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1970), p. 311.
60 The specific problem of supply-side market inelasticity is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4.
61 For a detailed study of the interplay of interests and norms, see Graham Mayeda, “Who’s
calling the shots? Balancing the role of norms and interests through a historical approach to
the process of social policy formation,” unpublished manuscript (2002).
62 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G.Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Postmodernism
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 88. See also James D.
Gwartney and Richard E.Wagner, “Public choice and the conduct of representative
government,” in James D.Gwartney and Richard E.Wagner (eds) Public Choice and
Constitutional Economics (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), p. 7.
63 Michael J.Trebilcock, Douglas G.Hartle, J.Robert S.Prichard and Donald N. Dewees, The
Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1982),
pp. 15–17.
64 Mercuro and Medema, Economics and the Law, pp. 91–4; Trebilcock et al., Choice of
Governing Instrument, pp. 10–17.
65 Nicholas Barr, The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1998), pp. 89–90.
66 Steven Kelman, “A case for in-kind transfers,” Economics and Philosophy, 2 (1986), P. 55.
67 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare-state Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1990), p. 15.
68 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds qf Welfare State Capitalism, pp. 17–18. For a fuller
explanation of the class-coalition theses, see M.Weir and Theda Skocpol, “State structures
and the possibilities for ‘Keynesian’ responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain,
and the United States,” in P.Evans, P.Rushemayer and T.Skocpol (eds) Bringing the State
Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press); P.Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); G.Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); G.Esping-Andersen and R.Friedland,
“Class coalitions in the making of West European economies,” Political Power and Social
Theory, 3 (1982).
69 Gary S.Becker, “A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983), p. 371.
70 Clifford Winston, “Economic deregulation: Days of reckoning for microeconomists,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 41 (1993), pp. 1263, 1267. Winston points out that
“[a]ccording to Peltzman (1989), the implications of the Chicago theory are that compact,
well-organized groups (frequently but not always producers) will tend to preserve a
politically optimal distribution of rents across this coalition of well-organized groups,” p.
1267; see also Sam Peltzman, “The economic theory of regulation after a decade of
deregulation,” Brookings Pap. Econ. Act.: Microeconomics (1989), p. 1.
71 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 47ff.
for a discussion of the contrast between rationality and reasonableness. See also Jürgen
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996; originally
published in 1992 by Suhrkamp as Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des
Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats), in which he explains that politically binding
decisions, because they are made in the interests of the public, must have reference back to
the discourse of rights: “The constitutionally organized political system is… specialized for
generating collectively binding decisions. […] [I]n virtue of its internal relation to law,
politics is responsible for problems that concern society as a whole. It must be possible to
interpret collectively binding decisions as a realization of rights such that the structures of